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1990—2009: Special 20th-anniversary issue! 
 
his EAP is a special issue to celebrate our 
20th year of publication. It includes essays 
by four scholars who have made impor-
tant contributions to environmental and 
architectural phenomenology. Psychologist Bernd 
Jager explores how the lived nature of thresholds 
plays an indispensable role in human inhabitation, 
and philosopher Karsten Harries considers archi-
tecture as it might sustain physical and spiritual 
shelter. In turn, philosopher Jeff Malpas refutes the 
criticism of place as possession-based and exclu-
sionary, and geographer Edward Relph delineates 
a “pragmatic sense of place”—a style of reflection 
and practice that looks inward toward the unique-
ness of particular places but recognizes that those 
places are integrally related outward to the larger-
scale realm of other places and global interconnect-
edness. Editor David Seamon begins this special 
issue by discussing some key concerns readers have 
brought forward over the years in regard to the phe-
nomenological efforts promoted by EAP. 
 
Below: In the very first issue of EAP, we asked whether there 
might be a phenomenologically-inspired graphics of places, 
buildings, and environmental experiences. We reprinted sev-
eral illustrations, including the one here, from Mary Hufford’s 
One Space, Many Places (Washington, DC: American Folklife 
Center, 1986). This work is a qualitative study of the “Pine-
lands,” a distinct natural and cultural region of coastal New 
Jersey. This drawing illustrates the construction of a tradi-
tional Pinelands “crossway”—a pole road enabling woods-
men to haul cedar timber over infirm swampland. Drawing by 









EAP/IAEP Conference Session 
The 2009 meeting of the International Association 
for Environmental Philosophy (IAEP) will be 
held in Arlington, Virginia, October 31—November 
2, immediately following the annual meetings of 
SPEP (Society for Phenomenology and Existential 
Philosophy) and SPHS (Society for Phenomenol-
ogy and the Human Sciences). EAP will sponsor a 
special IAEP Monday-morning session (Nov. 2) on 
“phenomenological reconsiderations of conven-
tional environmental and ecological conceptions 
and problems.” Presenters include: biologist Leon 
Chartrand, geographer Edward Relph, philosophers 
Robert Mugerauer and Ingrid Stefanovic, and EAP 





Items of Interest 
The conference, Flesh and Space—Intertwining 
Merleau-Ponty and Architecture, will be held 
Wednesday, September 9, 2009 at the Mississippi 
State University School of Architecture in Missis-
sippi State, MS. This conference will be held in 
conjunction with the annual meeting of the Merleau 
Ponty Circle, September 10—12. The theme of the 
meeting is The Experience and Expression of 
Space.  Contact organizers Rachel McCann or 
Patricia Locke at: www.caad.edu/merleau-ponty/. 
 
The Third International and Interdisciplinary 
Conference on Emotional Geographies will be 
held at The University of South Australia in Ade-
laide, April 5-7, 2010. Papers are invited that “inter-
rogate emotion, society and space from diverse dis-
ciplinary and multidisciplinary backgrounds. We are 
interested in specific case studies as well as theo-
retical examinations of the nature of connections 
among these terms.” Contact:  
CPCSGlobalisation@unisa.edu.au. 
 
The Society for Existential and Phenomenologi-
cal Theory and Culture (EPTC) is a Canadian-
based international society of academics from vari-
ous disciplines. EPTC hosts an annual conference at 
the end of May or in early June in conjunction with 
the Congress of the Social Sciences and Humanities 
of Canada. In addition, EPTC publishes biannual 
issues of PhaenEx, a peer-reviewed, open-access 
electronic journal; and a triennial electronic news-
letter, About the Things Themselves. www.eptc-
tcep.net. 
 
News from Readers 
We received the following email from Finish archi-
tect and phenomenologist Juhani Pallasmaa in re-
gard to M. Reza Shirazi’s spring EAP essay discuss-
ing Pallasmaa’s phenomenological writings on ar-
chitecture: “Thank you for the latest issue of EAP. I 
read the review of my writings by M. Reza Shirazi. 
I agree with most of his observations and see no 
reason to respond [in detail]. Of course, a certain 
collage-like fragmentation is the very structuring 
idea of the kind of ‘fragile architecture’ that I write 
about as opposed to an architecture of ‘strong im-
age’ that aims at domination. 
“Some years ago I received an unexpected 
phone call from the Foreign Ministry in Helsinki 
with the message that the President of the Constitu-
tional Court of South Africa (who had written the 
South African Constitution with Nelson Mandela) 
was on an official visit in Finland and wanted to see 
me. I did not know the gentleman but welcomed 
him in my office. As he entered and we greeted, he 
congratulated me for my design of the new building 
for the Constitutional Court in Pretoria. 
“‘There must be a misunderstanding’, I said. ‘I 
have lectured in your country three times but never 
designed anything’. ‘Yes, you have’, he answered. 
‘When I was the chairman of the building commit-
tee, I read your essay on ‘fragile architecture’ 
[“Hapticity and Time”] carefully and gave a copy of 
it to every member of the committee, and we fol-
lowed your instructions carefully’. 
“Before he left my office, he gave me a video 
tape of the completed Constitutional Court Build-
ing, and told me that he himself had been develop-
ing a theory of ‘fragile law’. 
“This true story may interest you as an example 
of a rather unexpected consequence of a piece of 
architectural writing—one of the pieces, by the way, 
that Mr. Shirazi reads as ‘vague’.” 
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Twenty Years of EAP 
David S
 
t is difficult to believe that 20 years have 
passed since philosopher Robert Mugerauer, 
interior-design educator Margaret Boschetti, 
and I met over breakfast at an annual Envi-
ronmental Design Research Association (EDRA) 
meeting and envisioned a publication covering phe-
nomenological and related qualitative work explor-
ing environmental and architectural concerns. 





At that time, Boschetti and I were colleagues at 
Kansas State University, and we took on the task of 
co-editing a newsletter that would be published 
three times a year. As a way to incorporate the wide 
range of environmental scales and topics that we 
wished to include, we eventually settled on the 
rather lengthy title of Environmental and Architec-
tural Phenomenology, or EAP, for short.  
In the 20 years since that beginning, we have 
published 60 EAP issues that have included some 
150 essays; 60 book and film reviews; 130 news 
from readers; 350 items of interest; 470 publication 
citations; and 14 poems. Topics discussed have run 
the gamut from doing phenomenological research to 
the controversial matter of whether and how phe-
nomenological insights might have pragmatic value 
for designers and other practitioners. 
Having worked with EAP from the start 
(Boschetti retired in 2002, and I became sole edi-
tor), I have come to note recurring concerns that 
arise in discussions with readers and contributors. 
This special 20th-year anniversary issue offers an 
opportunity to highlight some of these matters. 
 
Insights Arising from Experience 
From the start, Mugerauer, Boschetti, and I agreed 
that the style of understanding emphasized in EAP 
should involve existential phenomenology—i.e., de-
scriptions, interpretations, and claims regarding 
human experience that are grounded in, arise from, 
and return to that experience and the lived reality of 
lifeworld. 
In other words, the foundation for conceptual 
and applied claims should be human experiences, 
meanings, actions, situations, and events as they hap-
pen spontaneously in the course of daily life. The as-
sumption is that there is no world “beneath” or “be-
hind” the world of lived experience, which means 
that conceptual understandings and applied actions 
must be grounded in this lived realm of reality. 
I 
Realizing that this relationship between experi-
ence and its secondhand depictions can be presented 
in simpler and more complicated ways, we have tried 
to offer a continuum of interpretive styles and venues 
ranging from narrative accounts that read like stories 
to sophisticated philosophical discussions that require 
considerable directed effort and attention. Much less 
successfully, we have attempted to offer graphic pres-
entations that describe phenomenological insights and 
principles in ways that might appeal to readers unin-
terested in or disinclined to expend the effort on more 
cerebral, word-based presentations. 
As one might expect, more philosophically in-
clined readers have sometimes complained that EAP 
entries are not purely or rigorously phenomenological 
enough, while readers less concerned with academic 
precision and depth have sometimes complained that 
EAP entries are too “dense” and unnecessarily com-
plicated. We have tried to shape most EAP issues in 
such a way that they offer a range of potential entry 
points via different modes and tenors of phenomenol-
ogical expression (with many entries not even men-
tioning or being aware of “phenomenology”!). 
Our key assumption has been that each of us is at 
a different inner place in our journey to understand 
with the result that a text resonating for one reader 
may make little sense or seem unimportant to another.  
Our hope is that a spectrum of presentations and 
“levels” allows readers to find some useful points of 
entry into the possibility of phenomenological insight 
and understandi
 
Theory & Practice Together 
Throughout our 20 years of publication, we have at-
tempted to deal with the intimidating topical and 
readership range generated by an expansive thematic 
like “environmental and architectural phenomenol-
ogy.” Though our readership is small (never more 
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than 150 subscribers per year), personal, occupa-
tional, and thematic interests are wide-ranging—from 
intrigued general readers to researchers, designers, 
builders, policy makers, artists, artisans, and the like. 
 One of the most difficult oppositions to hold to-
gether for such an eclectic readership is the fragile 
relationship between theory and practice. Scholars 
and other intellectually-focused readers may have 
little concern with how ideas and conceptual argu-
ments might be applied in realms of everyday action, 
whereas practitioners and readers of a realist bent 
may feel that EAP’s  more conceptually aimed entries 
are arbitrary, subjective, and without lasting value in 
real life. Again, our device for smoothing differences 
has been to present a range of themes, styles, and ori-
entations. A central assumption is that how and what 
we understand is how and what we make; therefore, 
finding more accurate ways to see and think should in 
turn strengthen design, planning, policy, and other 
pragmatic actions attempting to make the everyday 
world better. 
 The larger point is the extraordinarily compli-
cated nature of peoples’ lived relationships with the 
worlds in which they find themselves. One of the 
most significant conceptual contributions that phe-
nomenology offers environmental and architectural 
concerns is recognition that any talk of a people-
environment relationship is intellectually artificial. 
Existentially, people and environment are not sepa-
rate and two but indivisible and one. People are ines-
capably immersed and enmeshed in their world—
what Merleau-Ponty called “body-subject” and Hei-
degger called “Dasein,” or “being-in-the-world.” Be-
cause of this lived reciprocity between self and world, 
one cannot assign specific phenomena to either self or 
world alone.  
 This fact of lived immersion-in-world has im-
mense significance for design and policy because it 
suggests that the specific physical constitution of the 
world contributes to sustaining or undermining hu-
man experiences, actions, and well being. A central 
question that has arisen repeatedly in our 20 years of 
publication is whether we can recreate self-
consciously—through design, planning, policy, and 
other creative means—places, situations, and experi-
ences that, in the pre-modern past, typically arose un-
self-consciously and spontaneously, for example, life-
sustaining buildings, robust urban neighborhoods, 
lively town centers, or healthy, self-sustaining ecosys-
tems. As much as possible, we’ve tried to present 
scholarly and applied work that examines whether 
and how an explicit understanding of human and non-
human lifeworlds might assist in making those life-
worlds better. 
 
Allowing Things to Speak 
One way that founder Edmund Husserl described 
phenomenology was “to the things themselves,” by 
which he meant setting aside cultural, ideological, 
and conceptual prejudices so that one might be open 
to the phenomenon and offer it a supportive space in 
which it can present itself in a way that it most fully 
and truthfully is. In today’s postmodern times (that 
claim all meaning is relative, multivalent, and shift-
ing), the phenomenological interest in foundational 
structures like “place” or “lived body” is academi-
cally unfashionable. The point of view represented by 
EAP has regularly been criticized by poststructuralists 
and social constructionists as essentialist—i.e., as 
presupposing and claiming an invariant and universal 
human condition only revealed when all “non-
essentials” like culture, history, and politics are 
stripped away, leaving some inescapable core of hu-
man experience and existence. 
I hope that the wide range of topics showcased 
over the years in EAP demonstrates that a thorough 
phenomenological presentation of environmental and 
architectural experience requires that, in addition to 
human typicality, scholarly and practical efforts must 
and can explore the personal, social, and cultural di-
mensions of environmental, architectural, and place 
experiences. Further, I would argue that these people 
and place portrayals, grounded in the openness of 
phenomenological method, are often more accurate 
and more complete than social-constructionist or 
critical accounts that too often force fit their sub-
jects through some pre-defined set of cultural, po-
litical, gender, or socioeconomic filters and thus end 
in lifeworld misrepresentation and distortion. 
 
Making Better Worlds 
As EAP Editor, I often receive inquires from graduate 
students and other interested parties who wish to 
know what they should read to familiarize themselves 
4
Environmental & Architectural Phenomenology, Vol. 20 [2009], No.
DOI:
with phenomenological work on environmental and 
architectural topics. In writing this commentary, I 
suddenly realized that this might be a good time to 
construct a list of useful readings, which follows. 
What I have attempted is to include works that 
not only offer perceptive phenomenological insights 
but also hold considerable conceptual or practical 
power—e.g., Edward Relph’s remarkable phenome-
nology of place; Paul Krafel’s superlative efforts to 
“shift” perspective and thereby see the natural world 
in fresh, more accommodating ways; or Christopher 
Alexander’s superhuman efforts to understand the 
nature of making and environmental wholeness. Cer-
tainly, there are other important works that could be 
included, and I will gladly publish in future issues 
any additional entries that readers forward to me. 
I hope the essays of this special 20th-anniversary 
issue, written by four major figures associated with 
the phenomenological enterprise, demonstrate the 
continuing possibilities and vigor of phenomenologi-
cal work, which offers ways to better see and under-
stand the world and thereby perhaps improve that 
world through more attuned design, policy, and other 
practical efforts. 
 
Twenty-five Important Works in Environmental 
& Architectural Phenomenology 
 
This list has been compiled by David Seamon, Editor of Environmental and Architectural Phenomenology. Sev-
eral of the entries here are not explicitly phenomenological; they are included because they discuss important 
lived aspects of peoples’ dealings with environments, places, landscapes, buildings, and the natural world. Also 
note that this list does not include: (1) relevant “first-generation” texts such as  Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phe-
nomenology of Perception (1945), Gaston Bachelard’s Poetics of Space (1958), Mircea Eliade’s Sacred and 
Profane (1961), Otto Bollnow’s Human Space (1963), or Martin Heidegger’s writings on building and dwelling; 
(2) edited collections; (3) discussion of the nature of phenomenology; or (4) phenomenological research meth-
ods. For introductions to phenomenology, see D. Stewart and A. Mukunis, The Nature of Phenomenology (Ohio 
Univ. Press 1990); and L. Embree et al., eds., Encyclopedia of Phenomenology (Kluwer 1997). In regard to 
“empirical” phenomenological research, one of the best examples remains the four volumes of the Duquesne 
Studies in Phenomenological Psychology (Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1971—1983). 
 
 
1. Christopher Alexander, The Nature of Order, 4 






This four-volume masterwork explores the nature of a particu-
lar kind of order that Alexander calls wholeness, which, 
whether in nature or human-made, is the “source of coherence 
in any part of the world.” He argues that, wherever there is 
wholeness, there is life, which involves such qualities as good 
health, well being, vitality, handsomeness, and beauty.  
 
2. Henri Bortoft, The Wholeness of Nature (Great 
Barrington, MA: Lindesfarne Press, 1996). 
 
This physicist explores the possibility of a qualitative science 
of nature, drawing on the proto-phenomenological work of 
Goethe. The book is an essential contribution to a “phenome-
nology of wholeness” and provides insightful discussion as to 
what a phenomenology and hermeneutics of the natural world 
might entail.  
  
3. Gordon G. Brittan, Jr., “The Wind in One’s 
Sails,” in   M. J. Pasqualetti et al., eds., Wind Power 
in View (NY: Academic Press, 2002).  
 
This philosopher and inventor details his efforts to develop a 
place-based wind turbine founded in the Heideggerian-
inspired thinking of philosopher Albert Borgmann. A valuable 
real-world example of how the way we understand founds 
what we make and how we act. 
 
4. Anne Buttimer, “Grasping the Dynamism of Life-
world,” Annals of the Association of American Geog-
raphers, 66 (1976):277-92. 
 
This geographer provides one of the earliest efforts to identify 
environmental aspects of the lifeworld—e.g., social space, sense 
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of place, time-space rhythms, and the lived dialectic between 
home and horizon. She recognizes that both geographical and 
phenomenological thinking on the environmental and spatial 
nature of the lifeworld are incomplete and need integration con-
ceptually and practically. 
 
5. Edward Casey, Getting Back into Place (Bloom-
ington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1993; 2nd edition, 2009). 
 
This philosopher argues for place as a central ontological struc-
ture founding human experience.  Drawing on Merleau-Ponty, 
Casey argues that place is important existentially partly because 
of our presence as bodily beings: We are “bound by body to be 
in place.” Also see his ontological history of place—Fate of 
Place (Univ. of California Press, 1997). 
 
6. V. Frank Chaffin, “Dwelling and Rhythm: The Isle 
Brevelle as a Landscape of Home,” Landscape Jour-
nal, 7 (1989):96-106. 
 
This landscape architect provides a sensitive phenomenological 
study of the Isle Brevelle, a 200-year-old river community on 
Louisiana’s Cane River. Chaffin moves from outside to inside 
this landscape by presenting its regional history and geography, 
by interviewing residents, and, finally, by canoeing the Cane 
river, which he comes to realize is the “focus of the community-
at-home-and-at-large.” A valuable model for phenomenologies 
of real-world places and landscapes. 
 
7. Kimberly Dovey, “The Quest for Authenticity and 
the Replication of Environmental Meaning,” in D. 
Seamon & R. Mugerauer, eds., Dwelling, Place and 
Environment (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985). 
  
This architect argues that authentic environmental meaning is 
not a condition of the physical environment but, rather, a 
situation “of connectedness in the relationship between people 
and their world.” He asks how buildings and environments 
today might evoke a stronger authenticity and sense of place. 
 
8. Hassan Fathy, Architecture for the Poor (Chi-
cago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1969). 
 
This Egyptian architect tells the intriguing story of designing 
from scratch a village for 7,000 displaced Egyptian peasants 
known as the Gournis. A provocative effort to understand the 
Gournis’ lifeworld and to design dwellings, public buildings, 
and village spaces accordingly. 
 
9. Karsten Harries, “Thoughts on a Non-Arbitrary 
Architecture,” Perspecta, 20 (1983):9-20; reprinted 
in D. Seamon, ed., Dwelling, Seeing, and Designing 
(Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1993). 
 
To circumvent the dilemma of arbitrariness in environmental 
design, this philosopher calls for a language of “natural sym-
bols”—essential meanings providing identity and orientation 
in human life, for example, up/down, inside/outside, verti-
cal/horizontal, light/dark, and so forth. Also see his Ethical 
Function of Architecture (MIT Press, 1997). 
 
10. Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great 
American Cities (NY: Vintage, 1961). 
 
This book could be described as an implicit phenomenology of 
the city and urban lifeworld, which Jacobs interprets in terms 
of a small-scaled functional and physical diversity generating 
and fed by the “street ballet”—an exuberance of place and 
sidewalk life grounded in the everyday goings-on of many 
people carrying out their own ordinary needs and activities. 
 
11. Daniel Kemmis, The Good City and the Good 
Life (NY: Houghton Mifflin, 1995). 
 
Drawing on the ideas of Martin Heidegger and Christopher 
Alexander, this political philosopher considers the idea of urban 
wholeness and healing as it might have meaning for urban poli-
tics and citizenship. A central question is how citizens’ sense of 
responsibility for their place can facilitate a civilized politics. 
Also see his Community and the Politics of Place (Univ. of 
Oklahoma Press, 1993). 
 
12. Paul Krafel, Seeing Nature (Burlington, VT: 
Chelsea Green, 1998). 
 
This book points toward a phenomenology of the second law 
of thermodynamics, which says that all activities, left to their 
own devices, tend toward greater disorder and fewer possibili-
ties.  As a way to counter the second law, Krafel aims to see 
the natural world in new ways by shifting perspectives and 
actions whereby people increase, rather than decrease, the 
possibilities of the world through intentional, caring efforts 
grounded in firsthand awareness and understanding. 
 
13. Belden C. Lane, Landscapes of the Sacred (NY: 
Paulist Press, 1988; 2nd expanded edition., Oxford 
Univ. Press. 2001). 
 
This theologian examines the relationship between place and 
spirituality through four axioms that he believes will help one 
“to understand the character of sacred space”: (1) sacred space 
is not chosen, it chooses; (2) sacred space is ordinary place, 
ritually made extraordinary; (3) sacred space can be moved 
through without being entered; and (4) the impulse of sacred 
space is both centripetal and centrifugal, both local and uni-
versal. 
 
14. Jeff E. Malpas, Place and Experience (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999). 
 
This philosopher provides a difficult but well-argued account 
of “the nature and significance of place as a complex but uni-
tary structure that encompasses self and other, space and time, 
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subjectivity and objectivity.” Also see his Heidegger’s Topol-
ogy (MIT Press, 2006). 
 
15. Robert Mugerauer, Interpretations on Behalf of 
Place (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994). 
 
In providing an accessible overview of phenomenological, 
hermeneutical, and post-structural approaches to environ-
mental and architectural concerns, this philosopher focuses on 
the timely question of “how to have plural meaning and yet a 
basis for saying that not just anything goes?” Mugerauer finds 
a partial answer in what he calls “fitting placement”—a style 
of understanding, design, and policy that respects and re-
sponds to social and technological needs but also encourages 
the emergence of local peoples and places. Also see his Hei-
degger and Homecoming (Univ. of Toronto Press, 2008). 
 
16. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci (NY: 
Rizzoli, 1980). 
 
To develop a phenomenology of the spirit of place, this archi-
tectural theorist considers two key questions: (1) What are the 
generalizable lived qualities of genius loci? (2) How are these 
qualities expressed in particular places? (his examples are 
Prague, Khartoum, and Rome). An important contribution to 
understanding how qualities of the physical world contribute 
to landscape and place ambience and character.  Also see his 
Concept of Dwelling (Rizzoli, 1985). 
 
17. Juhani Pallasmaa, The Eyes of the Skin (London: 
Academy Editions, 1996). 
 
This architect examines how the design aesthetic of Modernist 
buildings largely emphasize intellect and vision and how a more 
comprehensive architecture would accommodate an environ-
mental experience of all the senses as well as the feelings. Also 
see his Encounters (Rakennustieto Oy, 2005). 
 
18. Edward Relph, Place and Placelessness (Lon-
don: Pion, 1976). 
 
Still the single most lucid and accessible demonstration of 
what phenomenology might offer environmental and architec-
tural concerns. Relph’s focus is a phenomenology of place, the 
lived heart of which he identifies as insideness—i.e., the de-
gree to which an individual or group feels a sense of belonging 
and attachment to a locale or environment, which thereby ex-
istentially is transformed into a place. 
 
19. Edward Relph, Rational Landscapes and Hu-
manistic Geography (London: Croom Helm, 1981).  
 
This book is a powerful explication of Heidegger’s notion of 
appropriation as a potential vehicle for a lived environmental 
ethic grounded in respect and care for the natural world—what 
Relph terms an environmental humility. 
 
20. R. Murray Schafer, The Tuning of the World 
(NY: Knopf, 1977). 
 
This book provides a history of the changing soundscape—the 
sonic environment. Schafer develops concepts directly appli-
cable to a phenomenology of the soundscape, including key-
notes (a landscape’s recurring natural sounds) and soundmarks 
(unique sounds that help make a place endearing). 
 
21. Theodor Schwenk, Sensitive Chaos (NY: 
Schocken, 1976). 
 
Using the approach of Goethean phenomenology. this hy-
drologist examines the character and patterns of water and air 
in motion, which he depicts in terms of meander, wave, and 
vortex. “Today,” writes Schwenk, “people no longer look at 
the being of water but merely its physical value.” 
 
22. Eva M. Simms, The Child in the World (Pitts-
burgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 2008). 
 
This psychologist offers a penetrating phenomenological account 
of early childhood experience, much of which “precedes articu-
lation.” Simms provides eye-opening chapters on embodiment, 
coexistentiality, spatiality, things, temporality, language, and 
historicity. One provocative claim that is effectively demon-
strated: “In the young child’s experience there is no inner world. 
There is also no outer world.” 
 
23. Ingrid Leman Stefanovic, Safeguarding Our 
Common Future (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2000). 
 
In working toward a phenomenology of sustainability, this phi-
losopher explores how place and emplacement might provide a 
foothold for grounding environmental responsibilities and ac-
tions in relation to particular individuals, groups, and localities. 
 
24. Thomas Thiis-Evensen, Archetypes in Architec-
ture (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1987). 
 
This book is a stunning effort to delineate a phenomenology of 
architectural experience by exploring how floor, wall, and 
roof, through the lived meanings of motion, weight, and sub-
stance, evoke various degrees of inside-outside continuity or 
separation. Offers an innovative way to see buildings. 
 
25. S Kay Toombs, “The Lived Experience of Dis-
ability,” Human Studies, 18 (1995):9-23. 
 
This philosopher, afflicted with multiple sclerosis, draws on her 
personal experience to construct a phenomenology of illness. 
She strikingly demonstrates how an understanding of phenome-
nological notions like the lived body provides “important in-
sights into the profound disruptions of space and time that are an 
integral element of changed physical capacities such as loss of 
motility.” Also see her Meaning of Illness (Kluwer, 1992). 
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Jager is a Professor of Psychology at the University of Quebec in Montreal. Many of his writings (sidebar, next 
page) are central to environmental phenomenology in that they explore existential dialectics often expressed in 
spatial and place terms—for example, the lived tensions between dwelling and journey, insider and outsider, 
house and city, or mundane and festive worlds. For thoughtful commentaries on Jager’s work, see: Essais de 
psychologie phénoménoguique-existentielle: Réunis en homage au professeur Bernd Jager, Christian Thiboutot, 
ed. (Montreal: CIRP, 2007); this volume includes a bibliography of Jager’s writings. The following essay is ex-
tracted from a longer paper, “Toward a Psychology of Homo Habitans: A Reflection on Cosmos and Universe,” 
presented at the annual International Human Science Conference held at Ramapo College, Mahwah, New Jer-
sey, June 2008.  bernd@ican.net. © 2009 Bernd Jager. 
 
 
he distinguishing trait of human habitation 
is that it establishes and honors thresholds 
that cannot be reduced to relationships of 
force. A threshold can be crossed only by 
mutual agreement: It represents a symbolic relation-
ship that has distanced itself from mere instinct, ap-
petite and brute impulse. As such, it constitutes the 
foundation for prayer and sacrifice as well as for 




A threshold embodies the typical and unique 
ways human beings are linked, both to the Earth and 
to the heavens and to their earthly and heavenly 
neighbors. It represents a limit that all at once sepa-
rates and binds human beings to what surrounds, 
undergirds, and overarches their existence. 
Approached in this way, the threshold consti-
tutes the ultimate foundation of a human world re-
flected in all building projects from the most primi-
tive cave or hut to the most magnificent palace or 
city, all of which we might even consider as mere 
variations on the theme of the threshold, the essen-
tial function of which is to hold separate and dis-
tinct worlds together. 
 
e think of a cosmos as an inhabited world 
shaped and ordered by customary limits and 
divided by hospitable thresholds in such a way that 
human and divine encounters become possible. The 
fundamental order of the cosmos is, therefore, a 
moral order, guided by custom and ritual and gov-
erned by a threshold that both separates and sym-
bolically unites human and divine neighbors. To be 
a neah-gebür, or neighbor, means to be a “near-
dweller” who “builds,” “farms,” and “dwells” 
(buan) “nearby” (neah) in such a way that he or she 
must cross a threshold and perform the proper ritu-
als to come into the presence of other near-dwellers.   
 
T 
The cosmos, understood as a neighborly world, 
is reflected or replicated in all inhabitable struc-
tures. A house, temple, or city is not only marked by 
thresholds. Each also manifests an absolute and ma-
terial limit made manifest in foundations, roof, and 
walls. The walls separating one house or town from 
the next may be understood as representing the 
memory of a painful, original division overcome 
through the gate or doorway. This original division 
cannot ever be completely healed or overcome. It 
must be accepted as a first condition for building a 
human life and dwelling in a human way. 
We are reminded here of the birth of an infant, 
understood as a first and painful separation from an 
all-providing mother. We think here also of the 
Genesis myth of Eve’s creation out of a rib taken 
forcibly from Adam’s chest and of the story of 
Adam and Eve being chased from Paradise. We find 
this theme of a fateful, original separation also 
elaborated in the Aristophanic myth as it is told in 
Plato’s Banquet. This myth represents the birth of 
humankind as the result of a punishment meted out 
to an earlier non-human race of arrogant giants who 
refused to maintain neighborly relations with the 
gods. To curb their arrogance, Zeus cut each of 
them in half, thereby hoping to make them more 
responsive to both the gods and to each other. 
W
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This operation was at first unsuccessful be-
cause the separated halves found no way to mutu-
ally interact to form a cosmos and create a human 
world. They succumbed to loneliness and despair. 
The gods then reshaped the halves so they could 
face, talk, and make love to each other. These new 
creatures could then dwell and relate to each other 
as neighbors. In this way, so the myth tells us, hu-
man beings were born. 
 
 
yths about humanity’s genesis are at the same 
time cosmogonic in that they relate the crea-
tion of a divine and human cosmos. In light of Bib-
lical and Platonic myths, we come to understand the 
building of walls and the construction of houses, 
domains, and cities as acts of material affirmation 
of an original, divine act of separation that broke a 
perfect, undivided world apart and opened the pros-
pect of a divided, yet neighborly, cosmos. 
If walls express consent to separation, we may 
think of thresholds as clearing the way to human 
and divine encounters, to love and friendship, and to 
the coming into being of a human community. In 
this sense, the very structure of an inhabitable do-
main repeats in the building and maintenance of its 
walls and thresholds, a cosmogonic narrative that 
tells of the coming into being of a human world 
marked by neighborly relations. 
Every threshold that guards an inhabited do-
main repeats the myth of a primordial and perfect 
unity that preceded the building of walls and the 
creation of a human world. The walls speak of the 
disturbance of that unity, while the thresholds speak 
of the subsequent miracle of love and desire that 
ordered a cosmos and made it a place fit for human 





e should note here that a cosmic or inhabit-
able space always refers to a space and a 
time that is inherently dual or plural, insofar as in-
habitable worlds or domains necessarily point to 
neighboring ones. Within a house or city, we are 
never totally enclosed, since walls are interrupted 
by windows and doors that speak of the surrounding 
world. An inhabitable domain inevitably makes ref-
erence to actual or potential other worlds with 
which it forms a meaningful whole. To inhabit a 
home means to inhabit at the same time a neighbor-
hood, a city, and a world. We cannot truly inhabit a 
cosmos without maintaining viable relations with 
neighbors and neighboring worlds. 
An ancient Greek proverb boldly proclaims that 
it is impossible to be human in isolation from other 
human beings. “Eis aner oudeis aner” can be trans-
lated as “one man, detached from all others, ceases 
to be human.” If we extend the logic of that prov-
erb, we can conclude that a house that offers no 
pathways to other houses and neighbors ceases to be 
a place fit for human habitation. That logic also re-
minds us that, if the Earth were to become detached 
from the heavens, it would no longer be able to 
shelter human beings in a human way. 
The essential dynamic of a cosmos concerns 
ongoing relationships between what might be called 
cosmic or neighboring pairs, the first of which is the 
Earth, understood as the dwelling place of mere 
mortals; and the heavens, understood as the dwell-
ing place of divine and immortal beings. The 
heaven-Earth relationship would thereafter be re-
created in the bond between mortal and immortal 
beings or in that of host and guest, man and woman, 
child and adult, or native and stranger. 
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When mortals no longer recognize the divine or 
when neighbors no longer partake in mutual inter-
est, the human world regresses to an archaic, unin-
habitable state, and cosmos dissolves into a physical 
universe. That archaic state can be symbolized by a 
house without windows or with doors forever shut. 
To confine one’s life to such a place would effec-





e have established that thresholds are sym-
bolic limits embodying the law governing 
human and divine relations. In contemplating a 
house, a temple, or a city, we note that portals and 
thresholds are places of vivid, personal interactions, 
while walls evoke a silent world of fateful partitions 
and separate destinies. Together, they create a space 
of dwelling that fosters community while also ac-
cording each person a separate, distinct life.  
The threshold not only separates and binds hu-
man beings; it also marries a private, intimate realm 
to an outside, public, workaday world. The interior 
space of a home is like a harbor from which ships 
sail forth in all directions and to which they return 
to bring home their gathered treasures.  
The threshold that both divides and joins an 
“inside” and “outside” sets in motion a dynamic of 
leave-taking and homecoming that inaugurates the 
temporal rhythm of work and play, of an active and 
contemplative life. This dynamic inside-outside in-
teraction demonstrates that a home cannot exist 
apart from the path leading from its doorsteps to the 
doorsteps of another house and another realm. This 
pathway interconnects not only neighbor to 
neighbor but also links a familiar world with un-
known surrounds. We reinforce and elaborate such a 
path when we leave the intimate supportive circle of 
family and friends to enter the workaday world or to 
undertake voyages to foreign shores. 
In short, an inhabited space, no matter whether 
it forms house, city, or cosmos, links together sepa-
rate and distinct worlds that thereby are transformed 
into a symbolic or cosmic whole. We speak here of 
a “symbolic” whole because its parts are all at once 
held apart and kept together by virtue of an inter-
connecting threshold. The word “symbol” originally 
referred to a “pledge” or “token” that usually took 
the form of a coin or a piece of pottery that was 
broken in pieces at the time friends had to part. 
Each would take a part of the whole and guard it as 
a symbol of their enduring unity. Only an inhabited 
world that is divided and reunited by walls and 
thresholds can conceive of symbols, and hence of 
love and friendship. 
 
rom whatever angle we approach the house or 
city, both reveal themselves invariably as a 
cosmos, understood as a place where the original, 
absolute separation symbolized by walls becomes 
humanized through the addition of windows and 
portals that grant access to neighboring realms. A 
house or a city becomes inhabitable by virtue of 
having joined together an inside and outside, a 
heaven and Earth, a self and another. 
F
W 
Building a house, a city, or a temple is therefore 
never solely a question of labor and technical skills. 
Neither should we understand an inhabitable struc-
ture solely as a technical instrument that protects us 
from the naked elements. The building of houses, 
temples, and cities should first and foremost be un-
derstood as a poetic achievement that repeats the 
genesis of a human world. As Mircea Eliade force-
fully reminds us in Le sacré et le profane (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1965), a house is not, in the provocative 
phrase of Le Corbusier, “une machine à vivre” but, 
on the contrary, “forms a whole that repeats the ex-
emplary creation wrought by the gods, in the form 
of a cosmogony” (p. 55). 
To enter a cosmos means to enter a world that 
cannot be fully encompassed by a single stance or 
point of view. It can only be explored through ex-
changes with others. To disclose the cosmos, we 
cannot remain stationary but must journey and ac-
cept a rhythm of coming and going, of entering and 
leaving, of living and dying. It is this temporal order 
that gives the hospitable cosmos its astonishing va-
riety and richness.  
This richness cannot be captured by violence 
and becomes obscured by dreams of total posses-
sion and complete understanding. Persons and 
things make their true appearance only after we 
have renounced dreams of conquest and after we 
become reconciled to the fact that cosmic realities 
are destined to forever escape our categories and 
elude our grasp. A human and divine cosmos cannot 
be encompassed or controlled. It can only be em-
braced. 
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Architecture” names, first of all, the art of 
building and, second, any structure raised in 
accordance with the rules of that art. Figura-
tively, it also refers to anything that has been 
set on a firm foundation and well constructed. 
Philosophers, especially, have found it useful to 
invoke architectural metaphors, and no one more so 
than the Frenchman Rene Descartes, who, con-
vinced that reason was sufficient to raise a concep-
tual edifice that would allow human beings to un-
derstand the world and their place in it, compared 
his method to that used by architects. 
But if the edifice his reason raised—his “spiri-
tual architecture,” if you will—remains a presuppo-
sition of the science and technology that have 
shaped our modern world, including our built archi-
tecture, his expectation that the progress of reason 
would provide human beings not only with physical 
but also spiritual shelter went disappointed. The 
conviction of the Enlightenment and of its heir, 
Modernism, that reason would lead humanity to-
ward an ever-brighter future, has been shattered by 
the horrors of holocaust, war, terror, and environ-
mental catastrophes. 
Architecture, too, is caught up in such disen-
chantment. Do we still expect it to build an envi-
ronment that will provide not just the body but also 
the spirit with adequate shelter? How will the world 
look as our children and grandchildren make their 
way? No doubt, buildings will still be part of that 
world: We would have to rid ourselves of our bodies 
to eliminate the need for physical shelter. But will 
there still be a need for architecture? Just what task 
remains for architecture today? 
Even to ask that question is to presuppose that 
“architecture” is not to be equated with “building.” 
To be sure, every work of architecture is also a 
building, but it is more, How is this “more” to be 
understood? A first answer is suggested by the tradi-
tional understanding of architecture as one of the 
arts. In The Ten Books on Architecture, the first and 
still most famous treatise on architecture, the Ro-
man architect Vitruvius demanded that the architect 
build “with due reference to durability, conven-
ience, and beauty.” [1]. Ever since, thinking about 
architecture has tended to take this demand pretty 
much for granted. 
 
Dreams of Beauty  
Consider, for example, the way in which architec-
tural historian Nikolaus Pevsner begins his influen-
tial An Outline of European Architecture with the 
seemingly self-evident observation: “A bicycle shed 
is a building; Lincoln Cathedral is a piece of archi-
tecture.” What distinguishes works of architecture 
from mere buildings, according to Pevsner, is that 
they are “designed with a view to aesthetic appeal.” 
In the light of that distinction, our initial ques-
tion could be rephrased: What need will there be for 
functional buildings that also succeed as aesthetic 
objects? For many, this revised question is answered 
by the very conception of the aesthetic object as that 
which gives pleasure simply because it is what it is, 
not because it is good for anything. Prize-winning 











trated this point of view when he celebrated the way 
one of Peter Eisenman’s houses turns its back on the 
world and the everyday cares and concerns of indi-
viduals: 
 
Thank God, I thought. This house has no concern for me and 
mine, over which it has no rights, but displays in every aspect 
and angle and fall of light the concern for the nature and 
beauty of building that is the architect’s trust and obligation 
[2]. 
 
But does such an aesthetic response provide us 
with a key to the responsibility of the architect or do 
justice to either beauty or architecture? Human be-
ings have always dreamed of a more beautiful 
world. The urge to decorate dwellings and tools—
indeed the human body—is as old as humanity. But 
the goal was rarely to create beauty for beauty’s 
sake. Across centuries and cultures, human beings 
have yearned to experience the presence of spirit in 
the things that surrounded them in order to feel at 
home in the world. Ornament had an animating 
function. When experienced as just an aesthetic ad-
dendum, decoration loses this aura.  
The aura that gives a building such as Eng-
land’s Lincoln Cathedral its special weight is threat-
ened as soon as architects take their primary respon-
sibility to be the creation of aesthetic objects. For 
what is “aura”? German critic and philosopher Wal-
ter Benjamin understood the experience of aura as 
an experience of spirit incarnate in matter. The ob-
server’s identification with something, say a coco-
nut with the look of a human face, gives it a special 
aura, lets it appear as more than just mute matter. 
But is this ever more than an appearance, an illu-
sion, read into things by the observer?  
Is the experience of aura then, at bottom, self-
deception? A child may experience rocks and ani-
mals as animate, endowed with the power of 
speech, and fairy tales preserve traces of an older 
magical experience of the aura of all things. But the 
commitment to objectivity that is a presupposition 
of our science and technology banishes spirit from 
matter. To us moderns, things do not speak, except 
perhaps as echoes of our own voice. Such echoes 
leave us alone and homeless. Has what we today 
call “beauty” not lost the aura beauty once pos-
sessed? Our answer depends on how much we allow 
our commitment to objectivity to limit our under-
standing of what deserves to be called “real.”  
Philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche’s answer to the 
question “What is the beauty of a building today?” 
speaks to this threatened loss: “The same as the 
beautiful face of a woman lacking spirit: something 
mask-like.” His metaphor helps us better understand 
his distinction between two different kinds of 
beauty: When the subject is a human being, we can 
more readily distinguish a beauty that is still experi-
enced as the incarnation of spirit in matter from a 
made-up, mask-like beauty—even if this latter 
beauty may be more “perfect” in its presentation.  
Crucial here are the different ways that beauty 
relates to what is beautiful. The first beauty invites 
the metaphor of a veil that conceals even as it calls 
attention to what lies beneath, be it face, body, or 
something sacred. Such a veil does not want to be 
appreciated for its own sake but as a boundary and a 
bond with what remains concealed—a threshold 
both separating and linking the sacred and the pro-
fane, the inner and the outer, the spiritual and the 
material. The second beauty would have us forget 
what is beneath. Such superficial beauty gains spe-
cial importance in a world in which all too much 
invites such forgetting. This beauty offers an escape 
from reality into a world of simulacra.  
Returning to our example of Lincoln Cathedral, 
do we capture its special aura when we understand 
it as a functional building overlaid with aesthetic 
intentions? The beauty of this church allowed the 
building to speak of life on this Earth, of death, of 
community, and of the promise of happiness—the 
profound issues that mattered most to those who 
built it. Into the ground of everyday buildings, the 
cathedral inserted a figure of utopia. This form of 
beauty provided spiritual shelter. In stark contrast, 
beauty that is enjoyed only for beauty’s sake lets us 
forget the burdens of our everyday existence.  
Nietzsche’s remarks on the beauty of architec-
ture appear in a section of Human, All Too Human 
bearing the title: “Stone is more stone than it used to 
be” [3]. But are not stones what they always were? 
Of course, the earlier reference to our modern 
commitment to objectivity already intimated what 
has changed.  
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The contrast Nietzsche had in mind would 
seem familiar to all of us and to hold not only for 
architecture: Perceived meaning often veils the ma-
teriality of the things we encounter. To better under-
stand this, consider some printed page. Matter, in 
the form of ink on paper rather than stone, is meant 
to communicate. And when we get caught up in 
some story, we may hardly be aware of the paper or 
the ink blackening our fingers. Our mind is focused 
on the ideas communicated by the printed words 
and our reactions to them. Here, in an obvious way, 
meaning veils matter. 
And do not buildings, too, have meaning in this 
sense, meaning that allows us to liken them to texts? 
When we enter a railroad station or a bank, what we 
see is not an assemblage of stones but shapes and 
surfaces that suggest the purpose or importance of 
the place and invite a certain behavior. In all archi-
tecture, meaning veils the materiality of the material 
of which buildings are made.  
The stones of architecture thus speak to us, 
though we may want to add that it is really human 
beings who endow these stones with meaning as 
both those who build and those who live in and with 
these buildings bring to them expectations and un-
derstanding of what purposes buildings should serve 
and what they should look like. In that sense, build-
ings cannot help but speak to us. But how then to 
understand Nietzsche’s claim that “stone is more 
stone today than it used to be”? In what sense had 
the buildings of his day lost their ability to speak?  
Nietzsche was thinking of Neo-Gothic churches 
and Neo-Renaissance city halls, of apartment 
houses given the look of Baroque palaces, of banks 
built in the image of Greek temples. In the way they 
appropriated past styles, such buildings did still 
speak, but the original significance of the styles that 
were appropriated could no longer be understood.  
The architecture of the second half of the 19th 
century offers ready illustrations of the mask-like 
beauty Nietzsche had in mind. Functional buildings 
were dressed up aesthetically with borrowed orna-
ment, whose former spiritual significance was no 
longer understood. In the first decades of the 20th 
century, just about every progressive architect, 
critic, or writer shared Nietzsche’s dislike of such 
architecture. This sense that architecture had be-
come a masquerade provoked many a Modernist to 
demand a more honest architecture that was respon-
sive to our modern reality and, in particular, to our 
science and technology.  
But have we today not returned to the “deco-
rated sheds”—to borrow a term from the authors of 
Learning from Las Vegas—of the 19th century, if in 
a new key? [4]. Consider Frank Gehry’s Frederick 
R. Weisman Art Museum in Minneapolis (1991-93; 
photo, lower left). I would not deny this museum’s 
distinctive beauty. But almost self-consciously, with 
its folded façade of brushed stainless steel, this ar-
chitecture brings to mind Nietzsche’s remark on the 
mask-like beauty of today’s architecture, here made 
conspicuous by the loose fit between glittering 
cladding and a quite ordinary shed. Whenever 
such a building lifts or drops its mask, the 
material beneath presents itself all the more 
insistently as the mute material it is, in this 
case terra-cotta-colored brick and concrete.  
 
Does the aesthetic approach not demand 
of the architect attention to certain visual 
qualities that help make his or her work aes-
thetically appealing—if not beautiful, then at 
least interesting? Such concern with aesthetic 
appeal, however, denies architecture the aura 
that once belonged to it. As Nietzsche ex-
plains: 
 
Originally everything on a Greek or Christian building 









this aura of an inexhaustible significance surrounded the 
building like a magical veil [5]. 
 
Our modern approach to architecture is gov-
erned by a very different understanding of the task 
of the architect: The architect is asked, among many 
other requirements, to create buildings that succeed 
as aesthetic objects—but the more successful the 
practitioner is in this regard, the more completely 
does the aesthetic object ornament and finally 
smother the building itself, transforming it into a 
mega-sculpture. The resultant beauty is experienced 
as but a mask, leaving what lies beneath pretty 
much untouched—and leaving us dreaming of a 
very different kind of architecture.  
 
Dreams of the Complete Building  
That architecture has difficulty rising to the purity 
found in modern painting or sculpture is evident. 
Reality, with its own demands, places too many re-
straints on the architect. This shows itself in the dis-
jointed appearance of countless decorated sheds. 
But should great architecture not overcome that ten-
sion by embracing that reality more completely, in-
stead of hiding it beneath some beautiful mask? 
Valery’s definition of poetry as “an effort by 
one man to create an artificial and ideal order of a 
material of vulgar origin,” the material in this case 
being ordinary language, invites application to ar-
chitecture: Architecture is an effort by one individ-
ual to create an artificial and ideal order out of a 
material of vulgar origin, the material now fur-
nished by all the requirements of building [6]. 
Frank Lloyd Wright’s dream of an organic ar-
chitecture that would make it “quite impossible to 
consider the building as one thing, its furnishings 
another and its setting and environment still an-
other” points in this direction: “The very chairs and 
tables, cabinets and even musical instruments, 
where practicable, are of the building itself, never 
fixtures upon it” [7]. Residents of such a house 
would be expected to behave, perhaps even to dress 
and eat in ways that would preserve the integrity of 
the aesthetic whole.  
Such dreams invite an aestheticization of life, 
and because the physical and social environment, 
too, are to be incorporated into the aesthetic whole, 
an aestheticization of politics. Architects and theo-
rists have long dreamed of architectural concepts 
that might gather some multitude into a genuine 
community. As religion proved less and less able to 
offer effective spiritual shelter, such dreams gained 
a new actuality: Why should some genius not be 
able to create a city that would once again allow 
individuals to discover their vocation as parts of a 
greater whole? Presupposed is the conviction, ar-
ticulated by Nietzsche, “that the human being has 
value, meaning only in as much as he is a stone in a 
great building” [8].  
Nietzsche knew this kind of dream is likely to 
strike many as a nightmare. We are too committed 
to the autonomy of the individual, too preoccupied 
with the self, to furnish suitable material for such an 
architecture. But this does not mean that we do not 
dream of it now and then. Those spiritually at sea 
may well long for some architecture strong enough 
to bind or crush freedom. (In the absence of Moses, 
they may call for Aaron and the golden calf.)  
This dream has seduced many Modern archi-
tects. Walter Gropius invited Bauhaus students to 
see themselves as part of a new elite, from which 
would grow a new belief, “a universally great, en-
during, spiritual-religious idea,” that would find an 
architectural expression worthy to take its place be-
side the great cathedrals. Projecting the “miracle of 
the Gothic cathedrals” into the future, Gropius envi-
sioned an architecture that once again was “the 
crystalline expression of man’s noblest thoughts, his 
ardour, his humanity, his faith, his religion!” [9].  
We may wonder whether architects like Paul 
Ludwig Troost and Albert Speer did not come closer 
to realizing the dream of a new cathedral than did 
the Bauhaus, although, like German philosopher 
Martin Heidegger, Nazi architects preferred the 
paradigms furnished by the Greek temple, trans-
posed into a cold monumentality that reduces the 
individual to insignificance. As long as nostalgia 
looks to architecture to furnish human beings with 
spiritual shelter, it will also feed dreams of Babel’s 
tower. All dreams of the complete building are 
shadowed by that tower.  
 
Dreams of Freedom  
Does the kind of edifying architecture represented 
by Lincoln Cathedral still have a place in our mod-
14





ern world? Does it not belong, as German philoso-
pher Friedrich Hegel insisted, to a never-to-be-
recovered past—where Hegel would have us affirm 
the death of architecture in its highest sense as part 
of humanity’s coming of age, no more to be 
mourned than the loss of the magic the world held 
when we were children? Perhaps the only spiritual 
shelter that can adequately protect us moderns is a 
conceptual architecture raised by reason.  
The French writer Victor Hugo suggested that 
the printing press killed the cathedral. Has the car 
not similarly rendered the place-establishing city 
obsolete, where the car is but one manifestation of a 
way of life that has brought us physical and spiritual 
mobility and, thus, a freedom that by now seems an 
inalienable right? How will the electronic revolution 
and all it stands for transform our sense of space 
and the need for architecture? 
Many today dream of a post-architectural fu-
ture. And with good reason: Must an ever more vig-
orous commitment to freedom of the individual not 
make us suspicious of all place-establishing archi-
tecture? In aesthetics, the shift from the beautiful to 
the sublime testifies to that change, where beauty 
has long been linked to the establishment of 
bounded wholes, while the sublime demands open 
space. Freedom, democracy, and the promise of 
open space go together. There is tension between 
the call for a place-establishing architecture and the 
value placed on freedom. French writer George 
Bataille was not alone in suspecting a prison in 
every work of architecture [10].  
Similarly, this desire for freedom will rebel 
again and again against the rule of reason. In his 
short novel Notes from Underground, Russian 
writer Fyodor Dostoevsky succinctly portrays this 
seemingly deep-rooted need to oppose modern soci-
ety’s reliance on the authority of reason. One of his 
characters acknowledges that: 
 
Twice-two-makes-four is, in my humble opinion, nothing but 
a piece of impudence. Twice-two-makes-four is a farcical, 
dressed-up fellow who stands across your path with arms 
akimbo and spits at you. Mind you, I quite agree that twice-
two-makes-four is a most excellent thing; but if we are to give 
everything its due, then twice-two-makes-five is sometimes a 
most charming little thing, too [11]. 
 
Recent manifestations of such contrarian think-
ing can be found in the architectural movements 
known as “deconstructivism” and “anarchitecture.” 
Influenced by the French philosopher Jacques Der-
rida, the former has liked to challenge well-
established expectations about what a work of ar-
chitecture should look like by playing with frag-
mentation, distortion, dislocation of familiar archi-
tectural elements, and surprising geometries, where 
the computer has greatly facilitated such play. By 
now, such gestures have descended from elite archi-
tecture into the vernacular and become a familiar 
part of everyday postmodern building practice.  
The neologism “anarchitecture” suggests build-
ings that rise without the architect’s art. It’s not a 
wholly new concept: Austrian architect Bernard 
Rudofsky’s Architecture Without Architects, pub-
lished in 1964, was a “frankly polemical” celebra-
tion of Old World vernacular building. But in the 
work of architectural historian Robin Evans and ar-
chitects Gordon Matta-Clark and Lebbeus Woods, 
the word speaks with a different, more oppositional 
voice: For them, anarchitecture is not a product of 
anonymous builders supported by the collective 
wisdom of generations in tune with the rhythms of 
nature, but very much the expression of individuals 
responsive to our rapidly changing cyber-world, 
ever on the verge of slipping out of our control. 
Anarchitecture here means cuts, ruptures, inser-
tions, and intrusions into the body of architecture 
that challenge its often all-but-overlooked rule over 
our lives, inviting more thoughtful consideration of 
architecture and its ruling ethos. Anarchitecture in-
vites us to fantasize about very different environ-
ments, very different ways of life. (Gordon Matta-
Clark, on the occasion of the 1973 dedication of the 
Twin Towers, in fact, called for their erasure, unable 
to even suspect that terror would all too soon realize 
what was meant only as a thought-provoking com-
ment. Of course, 9/11 has made words such as de-
construction or anarchitecture more difficult to use 
and invites weightier and more difficult reflections 
concerning the future of architecture.)  
Anarchitecture can be seen as a recent species 
of “fantastic architecture,” which has long commu-
nicated the tension between the generally accepted 
function of architecture (to provide physical and 
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spiritual shelter by bounding space) and our unruly 
imaginations that, moved by desire, fear, pleasure, 
or disgust, give birth to fanciful apparitions, fic-
tions, and dream visions, none of which rests on 
solid ground. 
Fantastic architecture belongs with utopia, this 
land that lies somewhere beyond our all-too-
familiar earthbound world with its place-assigning 
order. Utopia, in fact, possesses two faces: Eutopia, 
that imaginary realm where reason coexists with 
freedom and happiness; and dystopia, a realm where 
pain drowns freedom and mocks pretentious reason. 
Visions of paradise, Jerusalem, or the City of God—
realms where human beings, no longer bound by the 
spirit of gravity, are finally free to fly and where 
buildings will seem to float, immaterially, in bound-
less space—are thus shadowed by versions of the 
labyrinth, Babel, or hell—dark suffocating spaces in 
which lurk minotaur and devil. The seductive ap-
peal, not just of eutopic visions but also of dystopic 
ones (think of Piranesi’s Carceri) invites considera-
tion: While it does not lead to an architecture fit for 
earthbound mortals, it should make our building 
more thoughtful.  
 
Dreams of Nature  
Suspicion of architecture has attended thinking 
about architecture from the very beginning: In para-
dise, there was no need for building; in this garden, 
Adam and Eve were at home. And might artifice not 
recover what pride is supposed to have lost? Both 
English philosopher Francis Bacon and Descartes 
thus dreamed of paradise regained on the basis of 
science and technology. 
We are not done with that dream. Our architec-
ture shows that the Cartesian promise that reason 
will render us the masters and possessors of nature 
was not idle. But the history of the 20th century 
demonstrates that the possession of such power has 
not brought us wisdom. The shadow of Babel’s 
tower, which today so easily blurs with the shadow 
cast by fascist architecture, darkens many a Mod-
ernist dream of architecture and invites very differ-
ent thoughts. Was it not Cain who built the first 
city? Convinced that our true home is not to be es-
tablished by human artifice, painters thus liked to 
place the Nativity in some fantastic ruin.  
The same distrust of an architecture ruled by an 
all-too-human reason let the painter Friedensreich 
Hundertwasser call “the air raids of 1943 a perfect 
automatic lesson in form; straight lines and their 
vacuous structures ought to have been blown to 
pieces, and so they were.” He admonishes us to 
“strive, as rapidly as possible for total uninhabitabil-
ity and creative mouldering in architecture” [12]. In 
this connection, the decision by architects of the 
18th century to actually build ruins deserves consid-
eration, as does the related decision by Romantic 
painters to represent still-intact buildings as ruins.  
Related is the dream of buildings in the image 
of the architecture of animals. Juhani Pallasmaa has 
suggested that what makes their architecture so 
beautiful “is its total integration into the life pattern 
of its builder and to the dynamically balanced sys-
tem of nature” [14]. Its beauty figures what is de-
nied to us: a dwelling completely at home in nature, 
in tune with its rhythms.  
Today, such dreams have gained weight and 
been given a special urgency by ever-more-pressing 
environmental concerns. Green architecture has be-
come much more than just a slogan: It is demanded 
by a still expanding humanity on a collision course 
with finite natural resources. 
How should environmental problems, of which 
the energy crisis is only the most visible manifesta-
tion, affect the look of the built environment? How 
will they transform our still prodigal use of space? 
Will there be gardens on the roof of every building? 
Everyone who builds, no matter how modest the 
work, bears responsibility for how those who come 
after have to live with it. To meet that responsibility, 
architects must be able to meet the challenges pre-
sented by the environment and by the needs of still-
unborn generations.  
Common sense tells us that, in light of these 
environmental pressures, much of what we call de-
velopment today is in fact irresponsible. Not just 
this country but the entire world remains caught 
up—despite numerous warnings, prophecies of 
doom, and modest efforts to remedy the effects of 
waste and pollution—in a process that, if not 
checked by a changed attitude to this Earth, will 
lead to disaster or, rather, disasters. 
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The list is long and sobering: a deteriorating 
environment that will make clean water, air, and 
soil—not to mention relatively unspoiled nature—a 
thing of the past; wars over dwindling resources; 
mass starvation; and moral disintegration that could 
lead to the self-destruction of humanity itself. To 
ensure a livable environment for future generations, 
we must learn to consider physical space a scarce 
resource; to develop different, much denser settle-
ment patterns; and to imagine a less oppositional 
relationship between architecture and nature.  
Such efforts, however, are unlikely to be suc-
cessful without a change of heart. If shortsighted, 
selfish interests are allowed to continue to shape the 
built environment, we can only expect its further 
deterioration. Also needed is what German poet and 
philosopher Friedrich Schiller called an aesthetic 
education. Decisions to give a high-rise the look of 
a turning torso, as Santiago Calatrava did in Malmö, 
or an apartment building the look of a dancing cou-
ple, as Frank Gehry did in Prague, may lead to in-
teresting aesthetic objects but make no contribution 
to such an awareness. 
Needed is architecture that transforms our un-
derstanding of how we should live. A high standard 
of living measured by per capita income does not 
necessarily mean a high quality of life. What kind 
of life do we want for our children and our chil-
dren’s children? A greener architecture is needed, 
not just to address ever-more unavoidable environ-
mental problems but, more fundamentally, to help 
bring about a change of heart.  
 
The Architect’s Responsibility  
William Gass called “concern for the nature and 
beauty of building” the architect’s “trust and obliga-
tion.” Much depends here on how the nature of 
building and its beauty are understood. 
In the late 1950s the philosopher Paul Weiss, 
writing very much in the orbit of aesthetic Modern-
ism, defined architecture as “the art of creating 
space through the construction of boundaries in 
common-sense space” [15]. Like William Gass, he 
thought it important that the architect’s creativity 
not be fettered by “judges, critics, clients, and prob-
lems relating to engineering, city planning, and 
scales.” So he called on architecture schools to en-
courage students: 
 
to experiment with the building of all sorts of space, in all 
sorts of ways, with all sorts of material. They should have 
periods in which they do not care that their work may not in-
terest a client or that no one may ever build it or that it may 
not fit in with prevailing styles. Not until they take seriously 
the need to explore the possibilities of bounding spaces in 
multiple ways will they become alert to architecture as an art, 
as respectable, revelatory, creative, and at least as difficult as 
any other [6].  
 
But while such thinking has led to the creation 
of countless striking aesthetic objects, their often 
undeniable beauty resists inhabitation and contrib-
utes little to the creation of a successful built envi-
ronment. Like all aesthetic objects, such works in-
vite admiration simply for what they are. If we de-
mand that architecture provide both physical and 
spiritual shelter, the creation of such aesthetic ob-
jects fails to meet the architect’s special responsibil-
ity. Instead of shelter, it offers distractions. A differ-
ent kind of beauty is needed. 
Benjamin’s understanding of aura intimates 
such a beauty. Why does aura matter? An answer is 
suggested when Benjamin links the experience of 
aura to the experience of a person as a person: 
 
Looking at someone carries the implicit expectation that our 
look will be returned by the object of our gaze. Where this 
expectation is met (which, in the case of thought processes, 
can apply equally to the look of the mind and to a glance pure 
and simple), there is an experience of the aura to the fullest 
extent [17]. 
 
To experience the distinctive aura of the other 
is to experience an incarnation of spirit in matter so 
complete that there is no distance between the two. 
Although Benjamin is describing an interaction be-
tween two people, something of the sort is present 
in every experience of aura.  
Benjamin claimed that works of art have to lose 
their aura in the age of mechanical reproduction. 
Does this not also hold for works of architecture? 
Jean Nouvel points to what awaits us: 
 
From the moment an office building is made on the basis of an 
existing typology, whose technology and price and the condi-
tions for its realization are known, we can duplicate the build-










In the same conversation, French social theorist 
Jean Baudrillard said this about the then still-
standing Twin Towers: “These two towers resemble 
two perforated bands. Today we’d probably say 
they’re clones of each other, that they’ve already 
been cloned” [19]. To experience a work of archi-
tecture as a simulacrum is to experience it as un-
bearably light. (This observation of their design, of 
course, does not in any way take away from the un-
bearable weight we feel for the destruction of these 
towers and the subsequent loss of so many lives.)  
In this age of the computer, the very concept of 
aura may seem to betray nostalgia for something 
that lies irrecoverably behind us. But without some 
experience of aura, we feel alone and homeless. 
That is what makes the increasing loss of aura in the 
age of technical reproduction so frightening: Are 
not even human beings today in danger of losing 
that special aura that distinguishes persons from 
their simulacra? What in principle distinguishes a 
person from a robot with a computer brain? The 
loss of an experience of aura threatens the loss of 
our humanity.  
That threat is recognized by Baudrillard when, 
in his discussion with Nouvel, he takes the task of 
art today to be that of tearing away the masks that 
aesthetics and culture have placed over our suffocat-
ing artificial world, where the virtual threatens to 
displace the real. Art, he insists, should preserve the 
“enigmatic side” of things, should break open mod-
ern culture, which today is 
 
everywhere... a homologue of industry and technology... A 
work of art is a singularity, and all these singularities can cre-
ate holes, interstices, voids… in the metastatic fullness of cul-
ture [20]. 
 
Why such emphasis on singularity? At issue is 
the distinction between what artifice can produce 
and what is given. Whatever artifice can produce 
can, in principle, be reproduced. But the simplest 
thing, say a rock or a leaf, is infinitely complex, a 
unique given that resists full comprehension and 
therefore reproduction. 
What is at issue is related to the question: Why 
does aura matter? What allows us in this age of the 
technical reproducibility, not just of works of art, 
but increasingly of everything, to hold on to a fun-
damental distinction between the aura of human be-
ings, works of art, and natural objects? 
The threat that reproduction poses to our ex-
perience of the aura of things is also a threat to our 
own human essence. This makes it important to 
open windows in the conceptual architecture raised 
by reason, windows to dimensions of reality that 
resist comprehension and therefore cannot be repro-
duced. A successful work of art should have some-
thing of the enigmatic presence we experience in 
the face of a person. That, it seems to me, is a test 
that architecture, too, must meet if it is to continue 
to provide us with spiritual shelter. At stake is noth-
ing less than our humanity. 
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ne of my favorite descriptions of sense 
of place is poet Seamus Heaney’s discus-
sion of English romantic poet William 
Wordsworth. Referring to the Westmore-
land landscape that figures in Wordsworth’s poem 
“Michael,” Heaney writes that the landscape is both 
“humanized and humanizing” [1]. The landscape or, 
more generally, the place, is thus seen as itself hav-
ing a human character, while it also makes human 
those who live within it. 
 
The mutuality between place and human sug-
gested by Heaney has been a fundamental theme in 
much of my work, and, if we take it that such mutu-
ality is a real feature of the relation between places 
and persons, it goes a long way in explaining why it 
is that place and the sense of place take on so much 
importance in human life and experience. 
Of course, we don’t need to turn only to poets 
to know the importance of place in our lives. As a 
philosopher who frequently talks to both academic 
and popular audiences about place and the sense of 
place, I am struck by how readily ideas of place 
strike a chord in just about everybody. We all have 
our own stories about the places that matter to us, 
and about the ways in which our lives have been 
affected, and even shaped, by the places in which 
we live. 
 
In Tasmania, where I now live and work, this is 
particularly evident, and the island seems somehow 
imbued with a stronger or more self-evident sense 
of place than anywhere else I have been (a phe-
nomenon undoubtedly connected both with the 
character of Tasmania as an island as well as the 
darkness of much of its history). 
 
Putting Place in Question 
Although it seems an obvious, though not uncon-
testable, fact that place is important and appears 
easily recognizable as a key element in our lives, it 
remains a question as to why this should be so. Is 
our connection to place merely a contingent—an 
accidental feature of human life and experience? Is 
our connection to place merely a residue of the way 
human beings used to live—tied to a particular 
town, village or locality, and often having little or 
no experience of the world outside a certain narrow 
region? 
Perhaps in the globalized contemporary world, 
in which air travel brings everywhere to within little 
more than a day’s journey, and in which the elec-
tronic media can connect us with just about any-
where, the idea that we have a special connection to 
place will come to seem rather old-fashioned, and 
the very notion of a special sense of place merely 
another form of nostalgia for a past that is no longer 
relevant or real. 
If our connection to place is indeed merely con-
tingent and so can change as the circumstances of 
human life change, then much of the discussion of 
place and sense of place may well have to be 
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discussion that belongs to the past rather than to the 
present or to the future. 
This possibility is a significant challenge in it-
self. Those of us who think that place matters, even 
in the era of globalization and commodification, 
must be able to provide an account of the nature and 
significance of place that is grounded in more than 
just our own individual experiences or responses, no 
matter how widely they may be shared. What is 
needed is an account that gives insight into the nec-
essary character of place itself and that allows the 
connection to place to be seen as a necessary part of 
what it is to be human. 
In the absence of such an account, it will al-
ways be possible that the significance of place may 
be open to question. And more than that, in the ab-
sence of such an account, we cannot be certain 
whether our positive evaluation of place and of the 
sense of place is itself legitimate, or whether it may 
even be misleading or dangerous. 
Certainly, there are many contemporary theo-
rists who would argue that, if the advent of global-
ization does imply a loss of any real sense of place, 
then this is no bad thing and that the sooner we can 
discard the idea of a special connection to place, the 
better. In fact, for some, the idea that place has a 
special importance in human life, and that particular 
places have a special role in making us what we are, 
is itself one of the most dangerous and pernicious 
ideas in the whole of human history [2]. 
 
The Danger of Place? 
The argument for the inherent danger of place often 
proceeds by historical example: There are countless 
instances in which the idea that some individual or 
group has a special connection to some particular 
place, whether village, town or region, is the basis 
for acts of violence and exclusion, of varying de-
grees, against those who are seen as not of that 
place—as “other.” 
The examples are easy to cite: In the Middle 
East, the conflict between Israeli and Palestinian is 
centered around the claim that each makes to the 
same “homeland” and in which the city of Jerusa-
lem is the central focus for intractable disagreement 
and division; in the Balkans, the conflict in Kosovo 
is only the most recent example of a long history of 
conflict in which notions of land and identity play a 
crucial role; in Nazi Germany, the event that is the 
great horror of the 20th century—the Jewish Holo-
caust—was enacted on the basis of an ideology of 
“blood and soil” and the pre-eminence of the Ger-
man “homeland.” 
Even in Australia, we have seen recent attempts 
to defend particular areas by violent means against 
those who come from “outside,” the most striking 
example being the Cronulla beach riots of Decem-
ber 2005 [3]. The idea of a sense of place, some 
might say, is thus not just the vestige of a past we 
have outgrown but is also the root cause of inhu-
manity, conflict, violence and much suffering. 
Occasionally, one finds that this claim is rein-
forced, not merely by reference to examples, but 
also by a set of conceptual considerations that, in 
general form, run as follows: 
 
 Consider what is implied by the idea of a spe-
cial sense of place. For many people it means 
that the place “speaks” to them, that it has a signifi-
cance for them, and usually this means that the 
place plays a role in either reflecting something of 
their own sense of themselves or else that it actually 
shapes or is a part of that sense of self. Thus, when 
we say that we feel we belong to a place, we really 
mean that the place is part of who and what we are. 
 
 Think of what it might mean for this sort of 
special relationship between place and self to 
hold. If the relationship is one that plays a role in 
shaping my sense of self or in determining who and 
what I am, then one might suppose that the relation-
ship must be one that is somehow peculiar to me or 
to people who share a similar sense of identity and 
self—otherwise the relationship would not have any 
special sense for me, nor could it serve to shape my 
identity, as distinct from that of others. 
 
 Yet if the relation between my self and the 
places that are important to me is a relation-
ship that serves to shape my identity and so to give 
me a sense of self that distinguishes me from others 
(or at least from some others—from those, let’s say, 
who are not part of my community), then it must 
also serve to shape my sense of who is other just as 
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Now sometimes the reasoning seems to stop at 
this point, as if it were enough to demonstrate the 
dangerous nature of place simply by demonstrating 
the way in which place can be seen to underpin the 
opposition of self and other, friend and stranger, 
compatriot and foreigner. Yet, clearly, this is not 
enough to substantiate the claim that the sense of 
place is itself a dangerous or pernicious notion. Our 
connection to place may be part of what makes for 
the possibility of identity and so also of difference, 
but neither the fact of identity nor difference need 
be problematic in themselves. Something more 
must be added here [4]. 
 
 What seems to provide the necessary addi-
tional consideration, although it is seldom 
made explicit, is the idea that maintaining a sense of 
identity through connection to place necessarily im-
plies the violent exclusion of others from that place. 
In essence, so this idea seems to run, my belonging 
to place must always be based in the belonging of 
that place to me and only to me (or to my commu-
nity). Place and the sense of place is thus seen to be 
dangerous and pernicious because the relationship 
to place is always a relationship of ownership, even 
if often of disguised ownership. 
 
If place is as dangerous as sometimes claimed, 
then it must be because violence and exclusion are 
part of the very idea of place—are already implied 
in the very notion of a connection to place. But this 
would seem to be so only if our belonging to place 
is indeed understood to mean the belonging of place 
to us. And certainly it is hard to see how one could 
advance the line of reasoning that concludes in such 
a negative valuation of place without relying on this 
idea. 
Moreover, when we turn to the examples that 
are so often cited to support the claims of the nega-
tivity of place, we find that what characterizes those 
examples is precisely a tendency to assert sover-
eignty, authority, or control over the places to which 
belonging is claimed. The question that now 
emerges is this: Is it really the case that the assertion 
of our connection to place is merely another way of 
asserting control over place? 
 
 
Indigenous Notions of Place 
This question can be seen as returning us to the 
challenge that I referred to near the beginning of 
this discussion: Since the claim in question con-
cerns the necessarily exclusionary character of 
place, that claim can only be substantiated or re-
futed by looking to an account of the nature of place 
and our connection to it that is based, not in the con-
tingent or the individual, but in the necessary struc-
ture of place as such. Yet before we take up this 
matter in more detail, it is worth considering one 
way in which the idea of our connection to place is 
expressed that seems to stand as a direct counter to 
the idea that such connection is always authoritarian 
and controlling. 
The idea of an intimate connection between 
place and human being is a widespread, if not uni-
versal, feature of Indigenous life and culture. This 
idea was given popular expression in Bruce Chat-
win’s The Songlines (London: Penguin, 1987), 
which focused on the importance of place in “no-
madic” cultures, both the cultures of Aboriginal 
Australia and of the North African Bedouin, but it 
has also been the focus for many other works, both 
popular and scholarly, and it is an idea that is often 
taken as marking off Indigenous modes of life from 
the non-Indigenous. 
Significantly, those who would argue for the 
dangerous and pernicious character of place seldom 
direct their critique at Indigenous conceptions. One 
might view this as purely a consequence of political 
sensitivity, but given the argument I set out above, 
there may be a more fundamental reason for this. 
Indigenous conceptions of place assert an es-
sential belonging of human beings to the places they 
inhabit. In Aboriginal Australian culture, for in-
stance, one’s very identity, one’s totemic and kin-
ship relations, are inseparable from one’s country 
and the landmarks—the rocks, trees, waterholes, 
and so on—that make it up. 
Yet leaving aside the complications introduced 
by European notions of land ownership, there is no 
sense of this belonging to place in an Indigenous 
context that entails proprietorship or authority over 
the places to which one belongs. There may well be 
a sense of the importance of protecting and preserv-











anship—but this need not entail, except in the case 
of some ritual places, the complete exclusion of 
others. 
Moreover, for many Indigenous cultures, in-
cluding that of Aboriginal Australia, the relationship 
to place is established and sustained, not through 
the exercise of authority over the place—through 
ensuring one’s own exclusive access to it—but 
rather through journeying across it and through the 
stories that such journeying embodies and ex-
presses. The relation between place and human be-
ing is thus explicitly seen to be one in which human 
beings are indeed shaped by place and, while hu-
man beings may have a responsibility to respect and 
care for place, and so there is indeed a measure of 
mutuality here, it is human beings who stand under 




Although, as I noted above, the intimacy of the 
connection to place within many Indigenous cul-
tures is sometimes taken to be part of what marks 
off the Indigenous from the non-Indigenous, I take 
the Indigenous understanding of the human connec-
tion to place to provide important insights into the 
real nature and significance of place for both In-
digenous and non-Indigenous people. The sense of 
place that I referred to at the start of this discus-
sion—the sense of place that Heaney describes in 
terms of the landscape as “humanized and humaniz-
ing”—is a sense that I would argue should be un-
derstood much more on the model of Indigenous 
modes of thought than by assimilation to any dis-
guised form of ownership or control. 
Indeed, the whole point of Heaney’s emphasis 
on the importance of the sense of place is precisely 
to direct attention to the mutuality of the relation 
between place and human being—that while we 
may affect the places in which we live and so may 
take responsibility for them, those places also affect 
us in profound and inescapable ways. 
Much of my work on place has aimed at meet-
ing the challenge of providing an account of our 
connection to place that understands it as more than 
just an accidental feature of human psychology. In 
other words, my approach has been philosophical in 
character (philosophy being understood as the mode 
of inquiry that looks to uncover the fundamental 
nature and significance of things). As such, the ac-
count is grounded in a detailed analysis of the un-
derlying character of human being as well as the 
character of place. Significantly, it is also an ac-
count that mirrors key features of Indigenous con-
ceptions of place. 
Indigenous accounts of place emphasize the 
way in which place is formed and sustained through 
journey and movement, pathway and track. Not 
only does this suggest that our relationship with 
place is always one of active engagement with place 
and with that which is found within it, but it also 
means that place has to be understood as itself a dy-
namic and relational structure in which we are al-
ready embedded, rather than some static object over 
which “ownership” can simply be asserted. 
I have tried to capture this idea through an 
analogy with old-fashioned methods of topographi-
cal surveying in which one comes to understand a 
landscape or stretch of country, not through mere 
observation from a distance, but rather through 
one’s engagement with that landscape as one under-
takes repeated triangulations between landmarks, 
measuring distance and angle, as one traverses the 
distance from one landmark to another. The place 
that is the entire landscape is thus grasped as made 
up of a network of places, joined by the paths be-
tween, while those places are themselves made what 
they are through the way they are located in relation 
to each other within that larger landscape. 
On this account, then, place has to be under-
stood as essentially relational in character, and our 
own connection to place—our “sense of place” —is 
seen as emerging through our active engagement 
with that place and our embeddedness in the rela-
tions that make it up. Both these features clearly 
connect with features evident in Indigenous ac-
counts of place. 
Here we have the beginnings of a way of mak-
ing sense of the underlying nature and significance 
of place that can help us to see why the connection 
to place is not merely a contingent or outmoded fea-
ture of human being. But just as this account mir-
rors key elements of Indigenous understandings of 
place, so we can also see why our connection to 
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place cannot be construed on the model of our own-
ership of, or authority over, place. 
Place has an essentially relational structure, and 
our connection to place is such that we are always 
already embedded within that structure. As a result, 
place cannot be grasped as some possession over 
which we can take hold. Moreover, while our con-
nection to place operates through our engagement 
with and movement through place—and in so doing 
we allow the character of places to appear—we are 
ourselves inevitably shaped by those places, and so 
stand under their sway. 
We are, one might say, “owned” by place in a 
way that is quite different from any ownership we 
might attempt to exercise over particular places. Yet 
there is a mutuality here that is captured in 
Heaney’s description of the Wordsworthian land-
scape as “humanized and “humanizing.” It is 
through our engagement with place that our own 
human being is made real, but it is also through our 
engagement that place takes on a sense and a sig-
nificance of its own. 
 
“Owning up” to Place 
There is no doubt that we can and do make claims 
of ownership with respect to places, regions, and so 
forth. But this assertion of ownership operates at a 
very different level from that of our proper belong-
ing to place. Just as Indigenous conceptions of be-
longing may co-exist (if not always comfortably) 
with non-Indigenous notions of ownership so, too, 
may the idea of a human connection to place co-
exist with ideas of proprietorship and sovereignty. 
The mistake is to conflate these two very dif-
ferent notions. It is precisely their conflation and 
not the idea of place as such that underpins the vio-
lent and exclusionary responses to place that we see 
exemplified in the Middle East, in Kosovo, in Nazi 
Germany, and even in contemporary Australia. 
When we fail to understand the real nature of 
our connection to place and refuse to understand 
that connection other than in terms of ownership 
and control, then not only have we misunderstood 
ourselves, but we have also lost any real sense of 
place as such. To have a sense of place is not to own 
but rather to be owned by the places we inhabit; it is 
to “own up” to the complexity and mutuality of 
both place and human being. 
 
Endnotes 
1. See Seamus Heaney, “The Sense of Place,” Preoccu-
pations: Selected Prose 1968–1978 (London: Faber & Faber, 
London, 1984), p. 145. I also discuss this passage in the “In-
troduction” to Place and Experience: A Philosophical Topog-
raphy (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999). 
2. Perhaps the best example of such a view is in the work 
of the French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas—see especially 
his “Heidegger, Gagarin, and Us,” in Difficult Freedom: Es-
says on Judaism, trans. Séan Hand (London: Athlone Press, 
1990), pp. 231-34. 
3. These riots, which spread beyond Cronulla to encom-
pass an area of Sydney’s southern beachside suburbs known as 
“the Shire,” were sparked by the attempt on the part of some 
residents to defend themselves against what they viewed as the 
incursion of “outsiders” who were mainly of Middle Eastern, 
especially Lebanese, background. At a different level, but still 
within an Australian context, many would view the immigra-
tion and border protection policies of the Howard Government 
(which can themselves be seen as part of the larger context 
that gave rise to the tensions evident at Cronulla) to be based 
around a xenophobic desire to defend Australia from those 
who supposedly do not “belong.” 
4. One might suggest, of course, that there is already a 
basic human propensity to fear those who are different and to 
try to exclude others from what is our own, and that this is the 
only additional element required. Whether there is such a ba-
sic propensity has no bearing, however, on the question of 
place as such, since if there were such a propensity, this would 
mean that the conflict and suffering that is sometimes associ-
ated with claims to place is a consequence of a quite general 
feature of human psychology—it would not be a feature of the 
human connectedness to place in particular. 
 
 
From Malpas’ Place and Experience  (1999) 
In [recent] discussion, place… has been viewed with a great 
deal of suspicion as a romantic affectation or as arising out of 
some sedentary conservatism. But, if the arguments of the pre-
ceding pages are taken seriously, then place can neither be 
dismissed in this way nor can it be unproblematically taken to 
give support to any particular form of conservatism. 
       The complex structure of place, its resistance to any simple 
categorization or characterization, its encompassing of both 
subjective and objective elements, its necessary interconnec-
tions with agency, all suggest that the idea of place does not so 
much bring a certain politics with it, as define the very frame 
within which the political itself must be located. It is only from 
out of a grasp of place within which the political can arise that 
we can even begin to think about the possibility of a politics 
that would do justice to our existence as fundamentally an exis-
tence in and through place (p. 198). 
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he flexibility of the word “place” allows it 
to encompass a rich range of possibilities. 
It can refer to social context but more 
generally implies something about some-
where. No definition is needed to understand what it 
means when we say, for instance, “Save a place for 
me” or “Victoria—the place to be” (as license plates 
claim), or even when it is suggested by philosopher 
Thomas Nagel that “the world is a big, complex 




On the other hand, this range of uses suggests 
that a place can be pretty much whatever we want it 
to be. I agree with John Cameron that “the breadth 
of the notion of place… is both a strength and a 
weakness” and that ways have to be found to avoid 
its being so inclusive that it means all things to all 
people [2]. 
In this essay, I argue that a pragmatic sense of 
place must be an essential component in the devel-
opment of effective ways to cope with 21st-century 
environmental and social challenges. If place can 
mean whatever we want, this argument would be a 
vacuous exercise, so I will begin with some clarifi-
cations and restrictions. 
 
Place & Placelessness 
Anthropologist Clifford Geertz suggests that culture 
consists of webs of significance woven by human 
beings, in which we are all suspended [3]. Places 
occur where these webs touch the earth and connect 
people to the world. Each place is a territory of sig-
nificance, distinguished from larger or smaller areas 
by its name, by its particular environmental quali-
ties, by the stories and shared memories connected 
to it, and by the intensity of meanings people give 
to or derive from it. 
The parts of the world without names are undif-
ferentiated space, and the absence of a name is 
equivalent to the absence of place. Conversely, 
where communities have deep roots, it seems that 
their named places fuse culture and environment, 
and this fusion is then revealed in striking cultural 
landscapes. There is a scale implication here be-
cause, when the term “place” is used geographically 
(as in the expression, “The place where I live 
is…”), the reference usually seems to be to some-
where about the size of a landscape that can poten-
tially be seen in a single view—for example, a vil-
lage, small town, or urban neighborhood. 
T 
This sense of focus is, I think, a core notion of 
place corresponding closely with ideas of commu-
nity and locality. I stress, however, that, since in or-
dinary language a place can be at any scale from the 
world down to a chair, large places must be loosely 
comprised of smaller ones, and smaller places are 
nested within larger ones [4]. In other words, while 
place may be spatially focused at the scale of a 
landscape, it is not spatially constrained. 
The antithesis of place is placelessness, a sort 
of non-place quality manifest in uniformity, stan-
dardization and disconnection from context. If a 
place is somewhere, placelessness can be anywhere 
[5]. It is tempting to see place and placelessness as 
opposite types of landscape—to contrast, for in-
stance, the distinctiveness of a small town on the 
Costa Brava with a placeless industrial suburb of 
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Toronto—and to assume that place is good and 
placelessness is somehow deficient. 
But this oppositional thinking is simplistic. 
Rather, place and placelessness are bound together 
in a sort of geographical embrace so that almost 
everywhere contains aspects of both. Place is an 
expression of what is specific and local, while 
placelessness corresponds to what is general and 
mass-produced. Thus, even the standardized uni-
formity of placelessness always has some unique 
characteristic, such as the arrangement of buildings. 
And no matter how distinctively different 
somewhere may appear, it always shares some of its 
features with other places—for example, red tile 
roofs and white walls are a common feature of 
Mediterranean towns. These sorts of similarities 
make exceptional qualities and meanings compre-
hensible to outsiders. 
In a world of unique places, travel would be 
enormously difficult because nothing would be fa-
miliar; in a perfectly placeless world, travel would 
be pointless. It is helpful, therefore, to think of place 
and placelessness arranged along a continuum and 
existing in a state of tension. At one extreme, dis-
tinctiveness is ascendant and sameness diminished; 
at the other extreme, uniformity dominates and dis-
tinctiveness is suppressed. Between these extremes 
there are countless possible configurations. Theo-
retically, at the midpoint they are equal, but in ac-
tual landscapes such a balance is probably impossi-
ble to identify [6]. 
In short, things are rarely straightforward. For 
instance, distinctive identities can be borrowed, pla-
giarized, or contrived. At least two towns in the 
North American Rockies have reinvented them-
selves as Bavarian communities, and there are gon-
dolas in Las Vegas and on Lake Ontario. This geo-
graphical borrowing of strong place identities is not 
uncommon, and where it occurs the qualities of 
place distinctiveness have been made placeless. 
 
Spirit  & Sense of Place 
“Spirit of place” is a translation of the Latin genius 
loci. The Romans believed in a pantheon of gods, 
many associated with specific places. Each house, 
town, grove, and mountain was possessed by its 
own spirit that gave identity to that place by pres-
ence and actions. Though elements of a belief in 
sacred spirits of place persist—for example, in 
geomancy and feng shui—spirit of place now gen-
erally refers to a mostly secular quality, either natu-
ral or built, that gives somewhere a distinctive iden-
tity. 
In this “profane” meaning, spirit of place is un-
derstood as an inherent quality, though subject to 
change. When a settlement is abandoned, as has 
happened with many Canadian prairie towns, build-
ings collapse and spirit of place fades. Alternatively, 
as somewhere is built up and lived in, spirit of place 
grows. In this way, even an initially placeless sub-
urb gradually acquires its own identity, at least for 
many who live there. 
Sometimes “sense of place” is used to refer to 
what might more accurately be called “spirit of 
place”—the unique environmental ambience and 
character of a landscape or place. I prefer to keep a 
distinction between sense of place and spirit of 
place, though clearly they are closely connected. 
As I understand it, sense of place is the faculty 
by which we grasp spirit of place and that allows us 
to appreciate differences and similarities among 
places. Spirit of place exists primarily outside us 
(but is experienced through memory and intention), 
while sense of place lies primarily inside us (but is 
aroused by the landscapes we encounter). From a 
practical perspective, this lived difference means 
that, while it is possible to design environments that 
enhance or diminish spirit of place, it is no more 
possible to design my sense of place than it is to 
design my memory. 
Sense of place is a synaesthetic faculty that 
combines sight, hearing, smell, movement, touch, 
imagination, purpose, and anticipation. It is both an 
individual and intersubjective attribute, closely con-
nected to community as well as to personal memory 
and self. It is variable. Some people are not much 
interested in the world around them, and place for 
them is mostly a lived background. But others al-
ways attend closely to the character of the places 
they encounter. 
 
Exclusion & Extensibility 
A strong sense of place appears to be partly instinc-
tive but can also be learned and enhanced through 
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the careful practice of comparative observation and 
appreciation for what makes places distinctive [7]. 
The deepest sense of place seems to be associated 
with being at home, being somewhere you know 
and are known by others, where you are familiar 
with the landscape and daily routines and feel re-
sponsible for how well your place works. 
There are two crucial qualifications regarding 
responsibility for place. First, while it is mostly a 
positive attitude that contributes to social and envi-
ronmental responsibility, sense of place can turn 
sour or be poisoned when it becomes parochial and 
exclusionary. NIMBY-ism and gated communities 
are familiar examples of negative place attitudes, 
but far more serious is ethnic cleansing [8]. This 
exclusionary tendency is always latent in sense of 
place. It can, however, be deliberately countered 
through the self-conscious development of a cos-
mopolitan perspective that grasps similarities and 
respects differences among places. 
Second, sense of place varies over time. Tho-
mas Homer-Dixon notes that, until about 1800, 
most people lived in rural areas, met, in their life-
times, only a few hundred people, communicated by 
speech and walking, and rarely traveled more than a 
few miles from their birthplace [9]. A century later, 
this situation still applied to my grandfather, who 
lived most of his life in a village in South Wales 
where he ran a small construction firm and built the 
house in which he died 30 years later. Such a geo-
graphically-focused life must have led to profound 
place associations, where each person, house, field, 
road, and custom was familiar and known by name. 
In some remote areas and in nostalgic beliefs, this 
intimate familiarity lingers into the present, but it is 
mostly a pre-modern experience. 
In dramatic contrast, our sense of place at the 
start of the 21st century is spread-eagled across the 
world. My daily 25-kilometer commute to work in 
Toronto is farther than probably most residents in 
my grandfather’s village traveled in their lifetimes. 
Conferences on the other side of the world, vaca-
tions in distant places, emails to colleagues on other 
continents—all are commonplace. 
In less than a century, both direct and vicarious 
place experiences have been enormously expanded. 
For large numbers of people today, it is normal to 
visit hundreds of places and meet thousands of peo-
ple in a lifetime. The geographer Paul Adams uses 
the term “extensibility” to depict the unexceptional 
fact that lives now extend easily among many 
places across scales from the local to global [10]. 
Modern networks of communication allow and even 
require that we continually situate ourselves in 
wider contexts and make comparisons with distant 
places, many of which we may have visited or at 
least seen on television. 
In short, sense of place today is far more dif-
fuse and distributed than even two generations ago. 
As a result, sense of place must, in some ways, be 
shallower. I simply have not spent long enough liv-
ing in one place to develop the deep associations 
that, for my grandfather, must have been taken for 
granted. I do not mean to suggest that the current 
extended sense of place is weak or deficient—only 
that it differs from pre-modern, rooted experiences. 
Indeed, some familiarity with different places 
facilitates an appreciation of the lives of others and 
provides an antidote for a poisoned, exclusionary 
sense of place. Familiarity with other places is also 
essential for grasping the connections between 
global processes and challenges and their manifesta-
tions in particular places. 
 
Emerging Challenges 
The 20th century began with optimistic expectations 
that social and environmental problems caused by 
industrialization would be corrected through tech-
nological innovation and political reform. There 
were remarkable improvements in productivity and 
standards of living, but there were also genocidal 
wars, technologies of annihilation, irresponsible en-
vironmental damage, and a remarkable failure to 
reduce global poverty. It is scarcely surprising, 
therefore, that the 21st century began pessimistically 
with numerous expressions of concern that our civi-
lization is generating insoluble problems usually 
characterized as global because they are wide-
spread. What strikes me, however, is that their con-
sequences will manifest locally, synergistically, and 
probably unpleasantly in the diverse places of eve-
ryday life. Attempts to deal with these consequences 
will need to be at least partially grounded in a care-
fully articulated sense of place. 
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In her Dark Age Ahead, Jane Jacobs suggests 
that “we are rushing headlong into a dark age.” 
Among other causes, she blames the decline of sci-
entific objectivity, systems of taxation remote from 
local problems, and demise of community [11]. 
Martin Rees, the Astronomer Royal, discusses the 
challenges posed by climate change, terrorism, and 
possible technological error. He gives our civiliza-
tion no more than a fifty percent chance of surviv-
ing to the end of the century [12]. 
Yet again, Thomas Homer-Dixon speculates 
that the problems we have created might exceed our 
capacity to solve them [13], while Howard Kunstler 
argues that we are sleepwalking into a future of 
converging and mutually amplifying catastrophes 
[15]. It is possible, of course, that such pessimistic 
predictions will amount to nothing. Critics highlight 
previous dire predictions that turned out to be 
wrong. This time, however, there are many inter-
connected, large-scale challenges arising simultane-
ously. The key message of commentators like Ja-
cobs and Rees is that our responsibility to coming 
generations requires that we take action now. 
The consequences of these challenges are un-
certain, but even brief reflection suggests they will 
be locally varied and will, at least in part, require 
place-based strategies for their mitigation. For ex-
ample, climate change is global but its conse-
quences will be as locally varied as the weather. As 
droughts, floods, and hurricanes intensify and be-
come more commonplace, one realizes that the in-
frastructure of both agriculture and cities—water 
supply, storm drains, flood walls, and so forth—has 
been designed for the weather of the past and is rap-
idly becoming obsolete. This shift suggests that, 
regardless of the causes of climate change, substan-
tial modifications to existing farms and cities will 
be needed to keep them productive and habitable. If 
they are to be effective, these modifications must be 
founded in the specifics of places, since the changes 
in weather patterns and environmental risks are re-
gional or local [16]. Adaptations to protect New Or-
leans against more intense hurricanes have little 
relevance for dealing with longer droughts in Syd-
ney or Melbourne. 
The challenges of climate change will be exac-
erbated by rising costs of energy. It is widely antici-
pated that oil and gas supplies will peak globally in 
the next few years and decline thereafter, precisely 
as Chinese and Indian economic growth drives de-
mand rapidly upward. Energy costs will rise dra-
matically, and the spatially distributed ways of 
modern life will be seriously compromised. In the 
reduced energy economy of the future, it is inevita-
ble that, for most people, high energy and travel 
costs will motivate an everyday life much more lo-
cally focused than currently. 
 
Living with Differences Locally 
Since the early1970s, a demographic imbalance has 
developed with rapid population growth in the 
Third World and stagnation or decline in the First 
World. The economic disparities associated with 
this imbalance have been contributing factors to 
major migrations from developing to developed na-
tions. One result has been the emergence of what 
Leonie Sandercock calls “mongrel cities”—cities 
with racially and culturally mixed populations. 
Sandercock argues that a major challenge for 
21st-century urban planning is to find ways “for 
stroppy strangers to live together without too much 
violence”—in other words, to find ways to deal 
with ethnic conflicts and the politics of difference 
[16]. Sense of place is very much at stake here be-
cause of the extensibility of immigrants’ experience 
back to their home countries and because immi-
grants must establish connections with places origi-
nally built by cultures often vastly different from 
their own. One likely result will be tensions among 
different cultural groups. 
The solutions to these tensions, Sandercock 
claims, will need to be worked out at the local level 
so that different groups can find ways to express 
their identities in neighborhoods that are neither 
ghettos nor zones of exclusion. For this, she sug-
gests, there is no appropriate general theory. In-
stead, the need is a continuous process of place 
making that is curious about spirit of place, learns 
from local knowledge, and respects diversity. 
 
Global & Local Together 
International migrations are one component of 
globalization—the integration of the world into a 
single economic system connected by supply chains 
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and flows of people, capital, and information. These 
global flows are controlled and monitored through a 
network of some 100 “world cities” such as Tokyo, 
London, New York, Sydney, and Singapore [17].  
World cities are characterized by hub airports, stock 
exchanges, corporate headquarters, international 




In many ways, these world cities are infused 
with placelessness in that they are oriented more to 
the global marketplace than to their region or na-
tion. But these global cities also incorporate a local 
aspect. While transnational offices and manufactur-
ing facilities can bring jobs, kudos, and economic 
prosperity, they can also be abruptly relocated to 
other world locations where labor costs are lower or 
circumstances more profitable. When this happens, 
local communities suffer as jobs move away, people 
lose income, and inequities intensify [18]. 
Municipalities everywhere, but especially 
world cities, must find ways to protect themselves 
against such sudden shifts in the global economy 
over which they have little or no control. Even 
Thomas Friedman, a journalist with an unalloyed 
enthusiasm for globalization, suggests that such 
shifts pose a major challenge for finding a healthy 
balance between preserving a sense of local identity, 
home, and community, yet doing what is necessary 
to survive in a global economic system [20]. In 
other words, the need is a clear sense of place that 
also acknowledges the spatially-extended character 
of the economic systems underpinning our lives. 
Climate change, the end of cheap energy, glob-
alization, ethnic tensions in mongrel cities, and 
other complex challenges have arisen as pressing 
issues only in the last 25 years. The impacts of these 
challenges have a global reach, but their individual 
and combined consequences will be very different 
in quartiers of Paris, villages of Somalia, suburbs of 
Las Vegas, exurbs of London, skyscrapers of 
Shanghai, or favelas of São Paulo. 
Mitigation strategies will need to be founded in 
the particularities of places because there the conse-
quences will be most acute. But there is another, 
more philosophical, reason why place will be cen-
tral to future planning strategies: There has been a 
deep epistemological shift away from the rationalis-
tic assumptions of modernism—assumptions that 
promoted universal, placeless solutions to environ-
mental and social problems—to an acknowledge-
ment of the significance of diversity. 
 
Deep Epistemological Change 
Sandercock celebrates the demise of scientific ob-
jectivity because she sees it as a repressive instru-
ment of powerful groups with vested interests [20]. 
In contrast, Jane Jacobs considers its demise to be 
one cause of a potential dark age [21]. What both 
thinkers agree on is that scientific objectivity is in 
retreat, a view supported by many philosophers of 
science. Stephen Toulmin, for example, notes that 
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early 20th-century scholars shared a confidence in 
scientific method but then declares: “How little of 
that confidence remains today” [22]. In 1989, Tho-
mas Nagel suggested bluntly that “objectivity… is 
just one way of understanding reality” [24]. Mod-
ernist, rationalistic ways of thinking (which pre-
vailed for 400 years and underpinned the develop-
ment of industrial civilization) have lost their impe-
tus as we enter a period of postmodernity. 
It is difficult to assess the depth of this episte-
mological shift, not least because it is partly masked 
by the persistence of elements of the modernist 
paradigm locked into habits of thought, legislation, 
and established practices. Nevertheless, the shift is 
revealed in increasing political and legal challenges 
to those practices, in the importance given to heri-
tage preservation (modernism swept aside every-
thing old), in the widespread acknowledgement of 
the merits of differences of all kinds (modernism 
celebrated uniformity), and in the empowerment of 
women, Indigenous peoples, and minorities (mod-
ernism was patriarchal and colonialist). 
In postmodernity, no single approach, including 
scientific objectivity, is arrogated above others. In-
stead, there are multiple discourses to be heard and 
considered. Scientific objectivity has, of course, 
proven to be a particularly effective way of dealing 
with the world, and Jacobs is right to suggest it 
should not be quickly dismissed. 
One can no longer assume, however, that scien-
tific objectivity is the single best way to understand 
the world. The postmodernist position demands that 
every situation be grasped in its own terms; every 
action—scientifically based or not—can be con-
tested. Whereas modernist planning aimed to pro-
vide comprehensive solutions to what were consid-
ered universal problems, postmodernity requires 
negotiated strategies adapted to specific individuals, 
groups, and conditions. In other words, in both the-
ory and practice, postmodernity is oriented to diver-
sity and therefore to place. 
 
A Practical Sense of Place 
There has always been a practical aspect to sense of 
place whereby it might be translated into buildings, 
landscapes, and townscapes. This transformation 
involves not just construction but all means of de-
sign, planning, making, doing, maintaining, caring 
for, restoring, and otherwise taking responsibility 
for how somewhere appears and works. 
Until the 19th century, a practical sense of place 
was mostly unself-conscious as towns, villages, and 
farms were made without much attention to place as 
an identifiable phenomenon of human existence. 
Builders presumably followed some combination of 
experience, necessity, tradition, and sensitivity to 
site. This local distinctiveness (which we now ad-
mire as tourists or as devotees of place) developed 
in large measure because it was difficult and expen-
sive to move building materials very far. Traditions 
arose for the use of whatever was locally available. 
Industrialization and modernism undermined 
these local practices, partly through the use of 
placeless materials like iron, concrete, metal, and 
glass; partly through the invention of cheap means 
of transport; and partly through the invention of 
styles that were self-consciously international. 
Guiding design principles were efficiency and stan-
dardization. 
The outcome was an “International Style”—be 
it office buildings, multi-family housing, or interi-
ors—that could fit almost anywhere. This largely 
placeless approach to design peaked in the 1960s 
and has faltered since, as modernism lost momen-
tum. Today, the more dominant approach is that the 
diversity of communities and places should be em-
phasized rather than minimized in design. How this 
is to be done, however, is not entirely clear, al-
though heritage preservation, ecosystem planning, 
and a critical reinterpretation of earlier regional tra-
ditions are some of the ways offered. 
What is clear is that a postmodern approach to 
diversity cannot be based in a simple return to a pre-
modern sense of place. Postmodernism may cele-
brate diversity in design and appearance, but air 
travel, electronic communications, and standardized 
technologies are invaluable for reasons of effi-
ciency, safety, and convenience. A postmodern 
sense of place is simultaneously local and extended. 
I have already suggested that, although the 21st 
century will present social and environmental chal-
lenges at a global scale, the individual and com-
bined effects will be locally diverse. A practical 
sense of place will need be an essential aspect of 
29





any strategy to mitigate the global challenges. This 
practical sense of place must reflect the extensibility 
of postmodern life and grasp the broader, global as-
pects of the challenges it confronts. 
What is needed is a “pragmatic sense of place” 
that integrates an appreciation of place identity with 
an understanding of extensibility. A central aim 
would be to seek appropriate local actions to deal 
with emerging, larger-scale social and environ-
mental challenges.  
 
Pragmatism 
Over a century ago, William James wrote that 
pragmatism is “the attitude of looking away from 
first things, principles, ‘categories’, supposed ne-
cessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, 
consequences, facts” [24]. Pragmatism is an attitude 
that acknowledges change and variety: “The world 
we live in exists diffused and distributed in the form 
of an indefinitely numerous lot of ‘eaches’, coherent 
in all sorts of ways and degrees” [25]. 
In founding pragmatism as a philosophical 
movement, James and his contemporary, Charles S 
Peirce, declared that it should not be merely practi-
cal. Rather, they saw it potentially as a philosophi-
cal means of resolving logical and methodological 
confusions in science and philosophy. 
Today the philosophical understanding of 
pragmatism has changed. Scientific research is a 
corporate and state-aided activity expected to get 
practical results—a development occurring at the 
same time rational, scientific arguments have lost 
much of their epistemological authority. One conse-
quence is that neo-pragmatic philosophers like 
Stephen Toulmin and Richard Rorty now associate a 
tone of commonsense practicality with pragmatist 
philosophy. In the absence of a firm foundation for 
choosing between courses of action, these philoso-
phers suggest the best strategy is to attend to James’ 
realm of consequences and facts. “We have to return 
to the world of where and when,” writes Toulmin, 
“to get back in touch with the experience of every-
day life, and manage our affairs one day at a time” 
[26]. Rorty proposes that critical thinking must now 
involve playing off various concrete alternative 
strategies against one another rather than testing 
them against criteria of rationality [27]. 
The relevance of pragmatism to a postmodern 
sense of place is clear. In postmodernity, diversity is 
acknowledged in all its forms, and places are the 
diverse contexts of everyday life. Since there is no 
longer an overarching ideology that justifies scien-
tific approaches as better than other points of view, 
new building developments and other place changes 
are almost always contested. It is nevertheless es-
sential to get things done and respond to challenges 
like climate change and cultural conflict that, if 
nothing is done, will undermine the quality of life 
A pragmatic approach may be able to accom-
plish this task through careful assessment of facts 
and consequences, engaging people in discussions 
of the place and reaching imperfect but workable 
agreements in regard to which strategies are most 
appropriate for dealing with the challenges as they 
impact particular places. 
 
A Pragmatic Sense of Place 
A pragmatic sense of place combines an apprecia-
tion for a locality’s uniqueness with a grasp of its 
relationship to regional and global contexts. It is 
simultaneously place-focused and geographically 
extended. It is not a new way of thinking—in fact, 
aspects of it have always been a part of place ex-
perience but are now widely latent. 
A pragmatic sense of place is apparent in con-
trasting contexts like the designation and restoration 
of World Heritage sites, locally inspired artworks 
and festivals that awaken sense of place, supermar-
ket chains that sell local produce, and advocates of 
the slow-food movement and regional cuisine. 
More generally, everyday life involves con-
cerns such as health, education, pollution, and new 
development—all local, practical concerns that are 
part of place familiarity and affection. At the same 
time, everyday life involves distant travel and eco-
nomic and electronic connections around the globe. 
In short, a firm basis for a pragmatic sense of place 
is to be found in the experience of place and in the 
background of contemporary everyday life. 
It will not be easy to make explicit what many 
people know implicitly and to turn this knowledge 
into consistent actions. To resist the poisonous place 
temptations of parochialism and exclusion, a prag-
matic sense of place requires the difficult exercise 
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of what might be called “cosmopolitan imagina-
tion,” which can grasp both the spirit and extensibil-
ity of places, seeing them as nodes in a web of lar-
ger processes. 
Cultural conflicts, climate change, water short-
ages, and the effects of escalating energy costs will 
not fade magically into the background, nor is it 
enough to hope that muddling through will be suffi-
cient to deal with the problems. Strategies based on 
finding technical or political fixes may be possible 
but are hardly wise, given that new problems will 
almost certainly arise from unintended conse-
quences of new technologies. Furthermore, there is 
no way to push the epistemological genie of post-
modernism back into the hermetically sealed bottle 
of rationalism, so there can be no question that ra-
tionalistic, top-down solutions will be deeply con-
tested.  
Perhaps the most hopeful, reasonable strategy 
for dealing with emerging social and environmental 
challenges is to find ways to mitigate their effects in 
particular places. This strategy requires that every 
locality, place, and community must adapt differ-
ently. A pragmatic sense of place can simultane-
ously facilitate these adaptations, contribute to a 
broader awakening of sense of place, and reinforce 
the spirit of place in all its diverse manifestations. 
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